應募人屬性、股東財富效果與私募價格之研究

Abstract

摘 要 過去文獻對於普通股私募對股東財富的影響，並沒有獲得一致性的結論。其中最主要的原因是因著私募參與人屬性、私募條件及私募相關的不同宣告日(包括:董事會日、股東會日、訂價日、付款日或投資人確定日)，而有不同的結果。有鑑於此，本研究針對目前台灣法令對於私募之相關公告的要求，分別檢視其對股東財富效果的影響。同時進一步檢視影響私募折價的相關因子，尤其對於應募人的屬性進一步做深入的相關探討。採用事件研究法及迴歸分析，分別檢視股東財富效果與影響私募價格折價的影響因子，發現即便在不同私募相關的宣告日，並未發現資訊外洩的現象，董事會通過進行私募的宣告效果，其結果與半強勢市場假說一致。亦發現當內部人為應募人，所產生的股東財富效果，不如其他類型之應募人的宣告效果。至於影響私募折價程度的主要因子，為私募企業的市值、股價淨值比與私募比率。私募投資人屬性不同私募價格折價也有所不同，內部人所享有的折價比率最低，與企業融資的目的一致，主動型與被動型應募人的私募，為加強雙方之策略合作其折價比率較高，也符合管理者的利益假說一致。

ABSTRACT In the past literature, there is no consistency in the conclusions about the impact of common stock private placement to shareholders’ wealth. Differences mainly come from different investor characteristics, private placement discount, and declaration dates (including dates when board of directors decide to have private placement, when shareholders meeting approve to have private placement, when offering price announced, when payments were made，or when investors were identified). Thus, this paper intend to examine different announcement and its effect to shareholders’ wealth under related private placement regulations in Taiwan. Moreover, this study intend to explore factors that affect private placement discount, especially for different investor characteristics This study uses event study methodology to examine shareholder wealth effects surrounding private placements of common stock, and employs multiple regression models to analyze the factors of discount on private placement .The findings indicate that there is no information leakage before different declaration dates and semi-strong form market hypothesis in line when the date board of directors decide to have private placement. Furthermore, this study finds that impacts to shareholders’ wealth are smaller when investors are insiders. Empirical results demonstrate that market value, market–to-book ratio and equity dilution ratio are key factors that affect private placement discount. Also find that different investor characteristics have different private placement discount. Insiders’ smaller discount was in line with financing purpose. For strategic cooperation purpose, passive and active investors’ larger discount was in line with the management entrenchment hypothesis.