台灣獨立董事制度實證研究

Abstract

我國於2002年以促進公司治理之由，自上市上櫃規則中引進了獨立董事制度，強制新上市上櫃之公司，必須設置獨立董事。而法律上正式明文規定獨立董事，係至2006年始於證券交易法中增修，且依據該法之授權，主管機關得要求特定公司設置獨立董事等制度。主管機關於授權法規訂定後，也快速地發布了「公開發行公司應設置獨立董事適用範圍」。故架構上，我國之制度係屬部分自由適用，部分強制適用的模式。

我國設計的獨立董事架構，不論是過程或實質內容，均與美國的獨立董事制度有所差距。美國獨立董事的發展歷程，是透過多重因素的影響，自然發展而成。其中重要的因素，包括有董事會監督地位的鞏固、司法的力量、股東價值最大化主義等。而我國探討獨立董事之設置趨勢之研究，尤其針對影響獨立董事設置因子之研究，比較起美國對於此類的研究，在質量上仍有相對不足之處。

因此，本論文將以實證數據分析為中心，從受規範公司之設置狀況，來探討我國引進獨立董事制度後的成果。結構上，本文首先自美國發展獨立董事之演進開始，藉由相關的討論與歷史發展，以瞭解美國對於獨立董事制度之更迭，以及此一制度如何成為促進股東價值之主要機制之一的過程。其次於實證調查部分，本文透過蒐集我國上市公司之公開資訊，描繪出上市公司實施獨立董事制度之現狀，並依照相關調查的結果，嘗試分析影響設置獨立董事之因子，以做為未來施政策略之參考與建議。

Taiwanese government introduced the US-originated "Independent Directors" system in 2002, in order to enhance the corporate governance in Taiwan. The first mandatory rule appeared in the listing rules of Taiwan Stock Exchange and Over-the-Counter Market, requiring new listing corporations in both stock exchanges to appoint independent directors. After the amendment of Securities Exchange Act in 2006, which officially incorporated the system into the statute, in accordance with the authorization from the Act, Financial Supervisory Commission issued a rule requiring certain public-traded companies (mostly large capital or financial company) to appoint independent directors on their boards. Taiwanese government created a mixed structure in which most companies are free to adapt the system; meanwhile certain companies are mandated to do so.

The path of development of independent director mechanism in Taiwan is different from that of the US. The US system has encountered various historical events and change of thought, such as a monitoring board restatement, judicial support for the implementation of independent directors, and shareholder value maximization, etc. All these events pushed independent director to be a major component in the corporate governance in the United States as it is today. Those differences aside, few studies have been done, especially about the factors that contributed to the implementation and the use of this new mechanism in Taiwan.

The thesis starts with the evolution of the US system with the intention of looking at how certain situations spurred the system to grow in the past. It then continues to analyze the data of the implementation of the system in Taiwan, in order to find factors that affect the distribution of the system. With the extensive data analysis, the thesis aims at providing further directions for later corporate governance policy adjustment.