Modeling Government Subsidies and Project Risk for Financially Non-Viable Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Projects

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日期

2012-03-01

類型

期刊名稱

EMJ-ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT JOURNAL

卷期與頁次

第 24 卷第 1 期

ISSN

1042-9247

語言

英文

摘要

Governments encourage private sector participation in building infrastructure through Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) agreements. Large projects may be financially non-viable despite their net economic benefits for the host society. Host governments might subsidize initial private investments to create financial feasibility. Small-scale subsidies might not sufficiently reduce project risks to attract private investment; however, large percentage subsidies might result in loose profit structures, discouraging the pursuit of efficiency. This article applies Monte Carlo techniques to data from the Taiwanese West Corridor High-Speed Rail Project to assess the subsidy-risk trade-off relationship. The results provide guidance for public-private negotiations.

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引用此條目

Liou, F.-M., Huang, C.-P., & Chen, B. (2012). Modeling Government Subsidies and Project Risk for Financially Non-Viable Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Projects. EMJ-ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, 24(1). https://ir.lib.nycu.edu.tw/handle/11536/16552

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永久網址:https://ir.lib.nycu.edu.tw/handle/11536/16552