Modeling Government Subsidies and Project Risk for Financially Non-Viable Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Projects
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日期
2012-03-01
類型
系所
期刊名稱
EMJ-ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
卷期與頁次
第 24 卷第 1 期
ISSN
1042-9247
語言
英文
摘要
Governments encourage private sector participation in building infrastructure through Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) agreements. Large projects may be financially non-viable despite their net economic benefits for the host society. Host governments might subsidize initial private investments to create financial feasibility. Small-scale subsidies might not sufficiently reduce project risks to attract private investment; however, large percentage subsidies might result in loose profit structures, discouraging the pursuit of efficiency. This article applies Monte Carlo techniques to data from the Taiwanese West Corridor High-Speed Rail Project to assess the subsidy-risk trade-off relationship. The results provide guidance for public-private negotiations.
關鍵詞
Build-Operate-TransferMonte Carlo SimulationMultiple Regression ModelNet Present ValueProject Management所屬典藏
期刊論文引用此條目
Liou, F.-M., Huang, C.-P., & Chen, B. (2012). Modeling Government Subsidies and Project Risk for Financially Non-Viable Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Projects. EMJ-ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, 24(1). https://ir.lib.nycu.edu.tw/handle/11536/16552
引用文字依 APA 第 7 版格式自動產生,使用前請再核對。
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永久網址:https://ir.lib.nycu.edu.tw/handle/11536/16552