Browsing by Author "Chang, Ray-Yun"

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MIXED COMPETITION AND PATENT LICENSING
(2015-12-01)
Chang, Ray-Yun
;
Lin, Yan-Shu
;
Hu, Jin-Li
;
交大名義發表
;
National Chiao Tung University
This paper studies the patent licensing decision of an insider patentee when two firms engage in a mixed (Cournot-Bertrand or Bertrand-Cournot) competition where one firm adopts the quantity strategy while the other uses the price strategy and vice versa. If either the fixed fee or royalty is applied, then the licensor prefers the fixed fee when the licensor takes the quantity strategy, while the licensee uses the price strategy (Cournot-Bertrand). If the two-part tariff is applied, then the two-part tariff is more likely to be adopted by the licensor under Cournot-Bertrand than under Bertrand-Cournot competition.
MIXED COMPETITION AND PATENT LICENSING
(2015-12)
Chang, Ray-Yun
;
Lin, Yan-Shu
;
Hu, Jin-Li
;
交大名義發表
;
National Chiao Tung University
This paper studies the patent licensing decision of an insider patentee when two firms engage in a mixed (Cournot-Bertrand or Bertrand-Cournot) competition where one firm adopts the quantity strategy while the other uses the price strategy and vice versa. If either the fixed fee or royalty is applied, then the licensor prefers the fixed fee when the licensor takes the quantity strategy, while the licensee uses the price strategy (Cournot-Bertrand). If the two-part tariff is applied, then the two-part tariff is more likely to be adopted by the licensor under Cournot-Bertrand than under Bertrand-Cournot competition.
The Choice of Prices versus Quantities under Outsourcing
(2018-07-01)
Chang, Ray-Yun
;
Hu, Jin-Li
;
Lin, Yan-Shu
;
經營管理研究所
;
Institute of Business and Management
This paper establishes a duopoly model with product differentiation and outsourcing in order to analyze the equilibrium competition strategies (choice of prices versus quantities) when the outsourcer outsources its intermediate good to a final product competitor. We show that: (1) both firms choose the quantity strategy when the cost efficiency of the subcontractor is low; (2) the choice of competition strategy is the price strategy for the subcontractor and the quantity strategy for the outsourcer when the cost efficiency of the subcontractor is moderate; (3) both firms choose the price strategy when the cost efficiency of the subcontractor is sufficiently high.