Browsing by Author "Chiang, Tsui-Lin"
Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
- Results Per Page
- Sort Options
Item type:Item, Affiliation and professionalism: Alternative perspectives on decomposing the board structures of financial institutions(2014-07-01) ;Yeh, Yin-Hua ;Shu, Pei-Gi ;Chiang, Tsui-Lin ;資訊管理與財務金融系 註:原資管所+財金所Department of Information Management and FinanceMost financial institutions around the world are under concentrated ownership. To protect rents and the private benefits of control, controlling owners prefer to include more affiliated members on their boards. This study empirically examines financial institutions in Taiwan a country that harbors both firms with controlling shareholders and pyramidal groups and its results verify the aforementioned postulation. We find that board affiliation is positively associated with control rights, cash flow rights and the control/cash flow deviation associated with controlling owners. In contrast, professionalism can disentangle controlling owners\' motives, as it is positively associated with the controlling-owner cash flow/control rights ratio and negatively correlated with the control/cash flow deviation. The results support the incentive effect associated with controlling owners. Moreover, the information argument provides auxiliary explanations for how boards are structured. Family is a catalyst for the bias toward lower levels of board professionalism. Finally, whereas board professionalism is positively correlated with stock returns during a financial crisis, board affiliation has a negative correlation. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Item type:Item, Managerial Overconfidence and Share Repurchases(2013-03-01) ;Shu, Pei-Gi ;Yeh, Yin-Hua ;Chiang, Tsui-Lin ;Hung, Jui-Yi資訊管理與財務金融系 註:原資管所+財金所Following prior studies, we use keywords in press portrayals to gauge managerial overconfidence. We hypothesize that managerial overconfidence is related to a manager's perception that the firm is undervalued. Results from 2744 share repurchase programs launched by 783 listed firms in Taiwan confirm this hypothesis. We find that managerial overconfidence is positively correlated with the intensity of share repurchasing, which is measured by scale, execution, frequency, and the difference between the announced price and post-execution price. Moreover, the programs launched by overconfident managers were not undervalued and therefore were associated with reduced post-announcement returns.