Browsing by Author "De, Prabuddha"

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Quality of Service Based Pricing Schemes for Content Sharing in Peer-to-Peer Networks
(2017-08-01)
De, Prabuddha
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Hao, Lin
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Li, Yung-Ming
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Tan, Yong
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電子工程學系及電子研究所
In this paper, we study quality-of-service (QoS) based pricing schemes that serve as incentive mechanisms to induce sharing behaviors in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks. We incorporate operational QoS metrics into users' utility functions and demonstrate how they affect individual users' content sharing decisions. Using a game-theoretic model, our study reveals how organizations respond to the changes of operational QoS metrics in their design of pricing schemes for various business objectives at different stages of network evolution. Our results show that a higher upload capacity can foster rational sharing to start when the network is small; however, it also discourages sharing behaviors when the network becomes large. In order to induce a socially optimal behavior, a pricing scheme will not charge users for requesting content while compensating them for sharing content. Such compensation is found to increase faster with the network size when the network is large. In order to maximize the profit of a monopolistic provider, however, a pricing scheme will charge content requests with a positive price while providing less compensation to sharing users compared to the socially optimal scheme. When the network size is small, such compensation can be even negative, which implies that a monopolistic provider discourages content sharing when the network is small, but encourages it when the network becomes larger. In addition, we find that more information about peer upload capacity discourages peers to share.
Self-Organized Formation and Evolution of Peer-to-Peer Networks
(2013-06-01)
Li, Yung-Ming
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Tan, Yong
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De, Prabuddha
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資訊管理與財務金融系註：原資管所+財金所
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Department of Information Management and Finance
Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks are social networks for pooling network and information resources and are considered superior conduits for distributed computing and data management. In this paper, we utilize the theories of social networks and economic incentives to investigate the formation of P2P networks with rational participating agents (active peers). The paper proposes a framework for multilevel formation dynamics, including an individual level (content-sharing decision and group selection) and a group level (membership admission, splitting, and interconnection). It is found that if the network size (the number of peer nodes) is sufficiently large, the stable (self-selected equilibrium) free-riding ratio could be nonzero, contrary to the common belief that everybody should free ride. The efficient (welfare-maximizing) free-riding ratio is not necessarily zero; that is, a certain degree of free riding is beneficial and should be tolerated. The sharing level in a network increases (decreases) with the download (upload) capacities of its peer nodes. In addition, the heterogeneity of content availability and upload capacity discourages sharing activities. Although the sharing level of a stable group is typically lower than that of an efficient group, the self-formed network may have a larger or smaller group size than what is efficient, depending on the structure of the group admission decision process. It is also observed that self-organized interconnections among groups lead to network inefficiency because the network may be over- or underlinked. To recover the efficiency loss during the formation process, we propose internal transfer mechanisms to force stable networks to become efficient.