Browsing by Author "Hong, I-Hsuan"

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An RFID application in the food supply chain: A case study of convenience stores in Taiwan
(2011-09-01)
Hong, I-Hsuan
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Dang, Jr-Fong
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Tsai, Yi-Hsuan
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Liu, Chen-Shen
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Lee, Wang-Tsang
Food hazards can appear at any stage of global food supply chains, making it essential to define critical control points to capture the data about ingredients, manufacture and dates-certain (sell-by, use-by), etc., and provide it in a transparent manner to supply chain participants and consumers. The government of Taiwan has appointed a non-profit research organization to conduct a pilot project to launch a potential national-wide food traceability system to increase the intangible value of purchased food and to enhance food safety. This paper discusses a financially viable business model for a Radio Frequency Identification (REID) application to a food traceability system. We conduct a case study of REID implementation in the chain of convenience stores in Taiwan. The Taiwanese experiment may have implications for policy-makers, industry and public health officials elsewhere. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Centralized versus decentralized decision-making for recycled material flows
(2008-02-15)
Hong, I-Hsuan
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Ammons, Jane C.
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Realff, Matthew J.
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工業工程與管理學系
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Department of Industrial Engineering and Management
A reverse logistics system is a network of transportation logistics and processing functions that collect, consolidate, refurbish, and demanufacture end-of-life products. This paper examines centralized and decentralized models of decision-making for material flows and associated transaction prices in reverse logistics networks. We compare the application of a centralized model for planning reverse production systems, where a single planner is acquainted with all of the system information and has the authority to determine decision variables for the entire system, to a decentralized approach. In the decentralized approach, the entities coordinate between tiers of the system using a parametrized flow function and compete within tiers based on reaching a price equilibrium. We numerically demonstrate the increase in the total net profit of the centralized system relative to the decentralized one. This implies that one may overestimate the system material flows and profit if the system planner utilizes a centralized view to predict behaviors of independent entities in the system and that decentralized contract mechanisms will require careful design to avoid losses in the efficiency and scope of these systems.
Decentralized decision-making and protocol design for recycled material flows
(2008-12-01)
Hong, I-Hsuan
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Ammons, Jane C.
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Realff, Matthew J.
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工業工程與管理學系
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Department of Industrial Engineering and Management
Reverse logistics networks often consist of several tiers with independent members competing at each tier. This paper develops a methodology to examine the individual entity behavior in reverse production systems. We consider two tiers in the network, collectors and processors. The collectors determine individual flow functions that relate the flow they provide each processor to the overall vector of prices that the processors determine. Because the exact final prices are unknown, each collector solves a robust optimization formulation where the prices paid by the processors are assumed to be within given ranges. The processors compete for the flow from the collectors until the Nash equilibrium is reached in this competitive tier, which sets the vector of prices to be offered to the collectors. To demonstrate the approach, a numerical example is given for a prototypical recycling network. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Determining advanced recycling fees and subsidies in "E-scrap" reverse supply chains
(2011-06-01)
Hong, I-Hsuan
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Ke, Jhih-Sian
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工業工程與管理學系
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Department of Industrial Engineering and Management
Primarily due to environmental concerns and legislative mandates, the disposition of end-of-life (EOL) electronics products has attracted much attention. Advanced recycling fees (ARFs) and government subsidies may play important roles in encouraging or curtailing the flows of recycled items. We present a Stackelberg-type model to determine ARFs and socially optimal subsidy fees in decentralized reverse supply chains where each entity independently acts according to its own interests. The model consists of one leader (the government) and two followers (a group of manufacturers, importers, and sellers (MISs) and a group of recyclers). To maximize social welfare, the government determines the ARFs paid by MIS and the subsidy fees for recyclers when MIS sells new products and recyclers process EOL products. We find that MIS and recyclers behave at the equilibrium status by choosing optimal selling quantity in the market and optimal reward money for customers bringing EOL products to recyclers. Under this approach the two fees achieve the maximum of social welfare at the equilibrium status, while both MIS and recyclers gain the maximum of profits. For comparative purposes, we also develop a conceptual model describing the current practice by which ARFs and the subsidy fees are determined on the basis of fund balance between revenues and costs along with recycling operations. We conclude that our results outperform current practice. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Equilibrium pricing and lead time decisions in a competitive industry
(2012-10-01)
Hong, I-Hsuan
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Hsu, Hsi-Mei
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Wu, Yi-Mu
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Yeh, Chun-Shao
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工業工程與管理學系
Pricing and lead time are two crucial decisions to a success in today's competitive markets. This paper examines the equilibrium pricing and lead time decisions in a duopoly industry consisting of two large and several smaller firms with competition. We solve the sufficient Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions for the Nash equilibrium solution. We characterize the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium solution of pricing and lead time decisions for both homogenous and heterogeneous firms. Our case study provides important managerial insights about firms' behavior under price and lead time competition in a semiconductor manufacturing industry. (c) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Modeling closed-loop supply chains in the electronics industry: A retailer collection application
(2012-07-01)
Hong, I-Hsuan
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Yeh, Jun-Sheng
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工業工程與管理學系
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Department of Industrial Engineering and Management
This paper proposes a retailer collection model whereby the retailer collects end-of-life products and the manufacturer cooperates with a third-party firm to handle used products, and a non-retailer collection model whereby a third-party firm is subcontracted by the manufacturer for collection work. While the return rate, manufacturer's profits, and channel members' total profits of the retailer collection model are not always superior to those of the non-retailer collection model, we find that the retail collection model analytically outperforms when the third-party firm is a non-profit organization for recycling and disposal. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Optimization of ambient intelligence systems
(2018-10-01)
Chen, Tin-Chih Toly
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Chaovalitwongse, W. Art
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Hong, I-Hsuan
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工業工程與管理學系
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Department of Industrial Engineering and Management
Planning the e-scrap reverse production system under uncertainty in the state of Georgia: A case study
(2006-07-01)
Hong, I-Hsuan
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Assavapokee, Tiravat
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Ammons, Jane
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Boelkins, Chuck
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Gilliam, Kennon
Due to legislative requirements, environmental concerns, and market image, the disposition of end-of-life e-scrap is attracting tremendous attention in many parts of the world today. Effective management of returned used product flows can have a great impact on the profitability and resulting financial viability of associated e-scrap reverse production systems. However, designing efficient e-scrap reverse production systems is complicated by the high degree of uncertainty surrounding several key factors. Very few examples of this complex design problem are documented in the academic literature. This paper contributes as analysis of a new, large-scale application that designs an infrastructure to process used televisions, monitors, and computer central pro- cessing units (CPUs) in the state of Georgia in the U.S. The case study employs a scenario-based robust optimization model for supporting strategic e-scrap reverse production infrastructure design decisions under uncertainty. A mixed integer linear programming (MILP) model is used to maximize the system net profit for specified deterministic parameter values in each scenario, and then a min-max robust optimization methodology finds a robust solution for all of the scenarios.
PRICING DECISION AND LEAD TIME SETTING IN A DUOPOLY SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
(2008)
Hong, I-Hsuan
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Hsu, Hsi-Mei
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Wu, Yi-Mu
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Yeh, Chun-Shao
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工業工程與管理學系
Pricing and lead time setting are two important decisions in semiconductor foundry industries. This research considers the competition of a duopoly market consisting of two make-to-order firms in semiconductor foundry industries and presents a model to determine the equilibrium price and lead time of these two competing firms where each firm maximizes its own revenue and is subject to its own constraints in a duopoly market. In the model, customer mean demand rates of two competing firms are assumed as functions of committed lead times and prices provided by these two firms and the market. Furthermore, this paper utilizes a simulated procedure to verify the equilibrium price and lead time obtained by the analytical model presented in this paper.
Selecting an E-Scrap Reverse Production System Design Considering Multicriteria and Uncertainty
(2008-10-01)
Chen, Wen-Chih
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Hong, I-Hsuan
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工業工程與管理學系
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Department of Industrial Engineering and Management
A reverse logistics and production network that deals with recycled material flows has become essential due to the growing concern about the environmental impact of disposed waste and the economic value of recovered materials. Reverse logistics infrastructure design is typically based on tradeoffs between different criteria and faces challenges posed by uncertain system parameters such as the reusability percentage and total supply of end-of-life products. This paper presents a novel method for selecting alternative infrastructure designs to effectively and systematically handle multicriteria cases without subjective weight determination for different criteria. The proposed method, in practice, helps decision makers evaluate and select a design from a pool of alternatives proposed by contractors who place bids for public tenders where the bids include infrastructure design information and associated performance estimates under different uncertain system parameters.
Socially optimal and fund-balanced advanced recycling fees and subsidies in a competitive forward and reverse supply chain
(2014-01-01)
Hong, I-Hsuan
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Lee, Yi-Ting
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Chang, Pei-Yu
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工業工程與管理學系
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Department of Industrial Engineering and Management
Advanced recycling fees (ARFs) and government subsidy fees are important for curtailing the consumption of new products and encouraging recycling and disposal of end-of-life (EOL) products. We introduce a model consisting of a leader (the Environmental Protection Agency, EPA) and two groups of followers (MIS firms and recyclers) consisting of manufacturers, importers and sellers, and recyclers which compete in both consuming and recycling markets. The EPA determines the ARFs paid by the MIS firms and the fees subsidizing recyclers to maximize the social welfare in closed-loop supply chains where the MIS firms and recyclers attempt to maximize their respective profit functions. To compare with current practice, we describe a conceptual fund balance model to determine the ARF and subsidy fee on the basis of the balance between total collected ARFs and expenditure of subsidies. Using numerical examples for the laptop computer market in Taiwan, we demonstrate that our results outperform the current practice. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
The Cournot game under a fuzzy decision environment
(2010-05-01)
Dang, Jr-Fong
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Hong, I-Hsuan
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工業工程與管理學系
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Department of Industrial Engineering and Management
The conventional precision-based decision analysis methodology is invalid for business decision analysis when precise assessment data seldom exist. This paper considers the Cournot game with fuzzy demand and fuzzy costs that are assumed to be triangular fuzzy numbers. Our model utilizes the weighted center of gravity (WCoG) method to defuzzify the fuzzy profit function into a crisp value. We derive the equilibrium Cournot quantity of each firm by simultaneously solving the first-order condition of each firm. Our model explicitly derives the necessary condition to avoid an unreasonable outcome of negative equilibrium quantities and lack of flexibility for modification of the ranking method. In addition, we examine the standard deviation of the fuzzy profit resulting from the fuzziness of each firm's cost and market demand functions. We conduct sensitivity analysis to investigate the effect of parameter perturbations on firms' outcomes. The results indicate that the center of parameter plays an important role in sensitivity analysis and dominates over variations in equilibrium quantity due to a perturbation of fuzzy parameters. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
The Cournot production game with multiple firms under an ambiguous decision environment
(2014-05-10)
Dang, Jr-Fong
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Hong, I-Hsuan
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Lin, Jing-Ming
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工業工程與管理學系
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Department of Industrial Engineering and Management
The recent economic recession has added more uncertainty to industries' decision processes regarding production quantity. Moreover, due to the nature of ambiguous information, manufacturers often fail to achieve precise assessments of the parameters of market demand, production cost functions, etc. This paper develops the Cournot production game with multiple firms in an ambiguous decision environment, where the form of ambiguity is described by a set of fuzzy parameters. Our model applies the weighted center of gravity method (WCoG) to defuzzify the fuzzy profit function considering firms' control parameters. The resulting outcomes are in the form of matrix representations. We also analyze the effect of firms' control parameters on outcomes. The results indicate that a firm's fuzzy profit function plays an important role in economic interpretation. To investigate the effect of parameter perturbations on firms' outcomes, we also conduct the sensitivity analysis. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
The equilibrium contract rent and reward money under incomplete information in reverse supply chains: A game theoretical approach and computational study
(2016-12)
Hong, I-Hsuan
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Dang, Jr-Fong
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Lin, Kuan-Wen
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工業工程與管理學系
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Department of Industrial Engineering and Management
Many electronic end-of-life (EOL) products are becoming obsolete sooner due to advances in technology. Hence, manufacturers hire third-party recyclers as subcontractors to recycle brand-name products. A complicated profile of recycling EOL products adds a significant cost burden to the third-party recyclers, while only the manufacturer has a superior understanding of the profile of recycling EOL products (homogeneity degree of EOL products). This paper describes the decision of the manufacturer and the third-party recycler in reverse supply chains under incomplete information of product homogeneity, which affects the unit profit of recycled products. The supply chain model assumes that customers receive reward money for returning obsolete products, and that the manufacturer as a leader and the third-party recycler as a follower determine the contract rent offered to the third-party recycler and the reward money paid to customers, respectively. Both the manufacturer and third-party recycler want to maximize their profit functions. We propose a game theoretical approach to search for the equilibrium contract rent for the third-party recycler and the equilibrium reward money for customers returning products for recycling. We conclude with a discussion of the impact of the contract rent and reward money on the equilibrium solution. (C) 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
The equilibrium quantity and production strategy in a fuzzy random decision environment: Game approach and case study in glass substrates industries
(2013-10-01)
Dang, Jr-Fong
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Hong, I-Hsuan
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工業工程與管理學系
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Department of Industrial Engineering and Management
This paper develops a two-stage Cournot production game that integrates strategic and operational planning under the fuzzy random environment, which to our best knowledge has not appeared in the literature. At the strategic level, two competing decision-makers determine the upper bound of a production quantity under a high-production strategy and the lower bound of the production quantity under a low-production strategy. Then at the operational level, the two competitors determine the range-type production quantity that is assumed to be a triangular fuzzy number represented by the apex and the entropies rather than a crisp value. The apex of a fuzzy equilibrium quantity can be obtained by the conventional Cournot game as the membership value is equal to one. A fuzzy random decision can be represented by entropies derived from the fuzzy random profit function of each firm in a specific production strategy. A case study of two leading firms in the glass substrates industry demonstrates the applicability of the proposed model. The finding that both firms would tend to adopt the common strategy coincides with observed real-world behavior. We conclude that our proposed method can provide decision-makers with a simple mathematical foundation for determining production quantity under a production strategy in a fuzzy random environment. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.