Browsing by Author "Huang, Hsing-Hua"

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A General Domain Name Appraisal Model
(2014-05-01)
Tang, Jih-Hsin
;
Hsu, Min-Chu
;
Hu, Ting-Yuan
;
Huang, Hsing-Hua
;
資訊管理與財務金融系註：原資管所+財金所
Domain names are labels for the Internet presence of organization. Despite the importance of domain names in contemporary economics, academia rarely discusses how to evaluate a domain name. Analyzing relevant literature and several related practices, we propose a general domain name appraisal model in this paper. The findings and proposals of this study may lay a theoretical foundation for further empirical studies.
Product market competition and credit risk
(2013-02-01)
Huang, Hsing-Hua
;
Lee, Han-Hsing
;
資訊管理與財務金融系註：原資管所+財金所
;
Department of Information Management and Finance
This study theoretically and empirically investigates effects of product market competition on credit risk. We first develop a real-options-based structural model in a homogeneous oligopoly and show that credit spreads are positively related to the number of firms in an industry. The disparity of firm size in an industry is relevant to both product market competition and credit risk, and we therefore extend the model to an asymmetric duopoly case. In particular, we demonstrate that credit spreads of relatively small (large) firms within an industry are positively (negatively) related to Herfindahl-Hirschman index, and the relative firm size in an industry is an important determinant of credit risk. The models' implications are empirically scrutinized by a reduced-form hazard model and generally supported. By performing out-of-sample analyses, the results demonstrate that firm size together with the interaction terms between intra-industry firm size dummies and competition intensity can effectively predict default. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Real options and earnings-based bonus compensation
(2012-08-01)
Huang, Hsing-Hua
;
Huang, Hongming
;
Shih, Pai-Ta
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資訊管理與財務金融系註：原資管所+財金所
;
Department of Information Management and Finance
This study extends the works of Mauer and Sarkar (2005) and Andrikopoulos (2009) by incorporating a regime-dependent earnings-based bonus into managerial compensation. Examining the individual effects of ownership shares and earnings-based bonus compensation, we find that the former provides managers with incentives to issue debt, whereas the latter induces the opposite result, although consistent impacts are found for the two types of compensation on both agency costs and the optimal investment decisions of managers. When managerial compensation comprises both ownership shares and an earnings-based bonus, there are significant differences in the effects of these two types of performance compensation on managers' optimal investment and financing decisions, agency costs, optimal debt ratios and credit spreads, as a result of the specific interactions between the investment and financing decisions. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Real options game over the business cycle
(2013-09-01)
Huang, Hsing-Hua
;
Chuang, Wei-Liang
;
資訊管理與財務金融系註：原資管所+財金所
;
Department of Information Management and Finance
This paper studies the impact of business cycles on firms' strategic investment decisions by developing and solving a continuous time regime-dependent real options game in an asymmetric duopoly. The value functions, roles and optimal investment timing decisions of the two firms in the expansion and recession states are jointly determined. We show that the preemptive investment equilibrium, where the leader invests earlier than its own first-best investment timing, is pro-cyclical. Moreover, the simultaneous investment equilibrium, where the firms simultaneously invest late and enjoy waiting flexibility as a tacit collusion, is counter-cyclical. In addition, we specifically demonstrate that the values of the leader and follower in the expansion state are smaller than those in the recession state when the preemptive equilibrium prevails in the expansion state and the simultaneous equilibrium prevails in the recession state. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.