Browsing by Author "Jhang-Li, Jhih-Hua"

Now showing 1 - 9 of 9

Analysis of pricing strategies for community-based group buying: The impact of competition and waiting cost
(2012-07-01)
Li, Yung-Ming
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Jhang-Li, Jhih-Hua
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Hwang, Ting-Kai
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Chen, Ping-Wen
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資訊管理與財務金融系註：原資管所+財金所
Group buying is one of the major pricing mechanisms in which retailers can offer low group rates due to a saving on transaction costs and its target consumers are those with lower sensitivity on waiting time. Under group buying, group size significantly affects the waiting cost to which consumers have different tolerances. In this paper, we develop a two-stage pricing game to evaluate the impact of the waiting cost, competition, and group-facilitating technology on the profitability and efficiency of community-based group buying. Our results point out that when a monopolistic retailer operates a mixed channel, the retailer will charge a relatively high group rates in the group-buying channel to force most consumers to choose individual buying unless the transaction cost in the individual-buying channel is sufficiently high. If two competing retailers adopt different pure channels, investment in group-facilitating technology may weaken the profit of the retailer adopting community-based group buying when the actual selling-cost saving resulted from community-based group buying is not significant.
Analyzing online B2B exchange markets: Asymmetric cost and incomplete information
(2011-11-01)
Li, Yung-Ming
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Jhang-Li, Jhih-Hua
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資訊管理與財務金融系註：原資管所+財金所
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Department of Information Management and Finance
This research applies the discriminating auction to analyze the online B2B exchange market in which a single buyer requests multiple items and several suppliers having equal capacity and asymmetric cost submit bids to compete for buyer demand. In the present model, we examine the impact of asymmetric cost and incomplete information on the participants in the market. Given the complete cost information, each supplier randomizes its price and the lower bound of the price range is determined by the highest marginal cost. In addition, the supplier with a lower marginal cost has a larger considered pricing space but ultimately has a smaller equilibrium one than others with higher marginal costs. When each supplier's marginal cost is private information, the lowest possible price is determined by the number of suppliers and the buyer's reservation price. Comparing these two market settings, we find whether IT is beneficial to buyers or suppliers depends on the scale of the bid process and the highest marginal cost. When the number of suppliers and the difference between the highest marginal cost and the buyer's reservation price are sufficiently large, each supplier can gain a higher profit if the marginal costs are private information. On the contrary, when the highest marginal cost approaches the buyer's reservation price, complete cost information benefits the suppliers. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Analyzing the Integration of WiMAX and Wi-Fi Services: Bandwidth Sharing and Channel Collaboration
(2013-12-01)
Li, Yung-Ming
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Jhang-Li, Jhih-Hua
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資訊管理與財務金融系註：原資管所+財金所
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Department of Information Management and Finance
Several emerging studies have focused on the pricing issue of bandwidth sharing between Wi-Fi and WiMAX networks; however, most either concentrate on the design of collaborated protocols or figure out the issue without the overall consideration of consumer preferences and contract design. In this study, we explore a wireless service market in which there are two wireless service providers operating Wi-Fi and WiMAX. One of the research dimensions given in this study is whether wireless service providers implement bandwidth sharing, while the other is whether they make decisions individually or jointly. By involving consumer preferences and a wholesale price contract in the present model, we find that bandwidth sharing would benefit a WiMAX service provider, yet a Wi-Fi service provider would make no significant savings under a wholesale price contract. In addition, the profit of a WiMAX service provider may increase with Wi-Fi coverage when bandwidth sharing has been implemented but decrease with Wi-Fi coverage when both wireless services operate without bandwidth sharing. Furthermore, the WiMAX service provider allocates more capacity when the average usage rate increases, but lowers the expenditure of capacity when the average usage rate is too high.
BUILDING COOPERATION IN VOIP NETWORK THROUGH A REWARD MECHANISM
(2008)
Li, Yung-Ming
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Cheng, Ding-Yuan
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Jhang-Li, Jhih-Hua
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交大名義發表
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National Chiao Tung University
In this paper, for solving the moral hazard problem of super nodes in VOIP network and achieving better communication quality, we establish a reward mechanism based on classical efficiency-wage models. In the reward mechanism, the function of reward is to encourage super nodes to contribute their bandwidth and cover their effort costs, whereas the function of fine is to prevent opportunistic super nodes from shirking. We consider that network quality and idle bandwidth are the essential criterions for selecting qualified super nodes. Once all super nodes can satisfy specific conditions, the required reward can be derived so as to improve the VoIP platform's revenue. Moreover, we also suggest several targets both in technical and economic view that the platform provider can strive in order to boost his/her market share. In addition, the case of Skype is discussed in this study and we also examine its current pricing strategy.
Knowledge sharing in communities of practice: A game theoretic analysis
(2010-12-01)
Li, Yung-Ming
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Jhang-Li, Jhih-Hua
;
資訊管理與財務金融系註：原資管所+財金所
;
Department of Information Management and Finance
This research applies game theory to analyze the incentives of knowledge-sharing activities in various types of communities of practice (COPs), characterized by individual profiles and decision structures. Indeed, individual decision making results in the under-provision of knowledge; however, the benefit of knowledge sharing may be raised by IT investment and suitable incentive mechanisms we study here. In general conditions, improving communication and collaboration technologies should be prior to developing data mining technologies. However, when the number of community members is sufficiently small and the heterogeneity of the expected value of knowledge among community members is sufficiently large, developing data mining technologies should be considered more important than the other if most community members are low-type ones. On the other hand, based on a screening technique, we find that the benefit of knowledge sharing in the incomplete information setting can be the same as that in the complete information setting if the cost of more efficient community member is smaller than that of less efficient one. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Knowledge sharing in communities of practice: A game theoretic analysis
(2010-12-01)
Li, Yung-Ming
;
Jhang-Li, Jhih-Hua
;
資訊管理與財務金融系註：原資管所+財金所
;
Department of Information Management and Finance
This research applies game theory to analyze the incentives of knowledge-sharing activities in various types of communities of practice (COPs), characterized by individual profiles and decision structures. Indeed, individual decision making results in the under-provision of knowledge; however, the benefit of knowledge sharing may be raised by IT investment and suitable incentive mechanisms we study here. In general conditions, improving communication and collaboration technologies should be prior to developing data mining technologies. However, when the number of community members is sufficiently small and the heterogeneity of the expected value of knowledge among community members is sufficiently large, developing data mining technologies should be considered more important than the other if most community members are low-type ones. On the other hand, based on a screening technique, we find that the benefit of knowledge sharing in the incomplete information setting can be the same as that in the complete information setting if the cost of more efficient community member is smaller than that of less efficient one. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Pricing display ads and contextual ads: Competition, acquisition, and investment
(2009-01-01)
Li, Yung-Ming
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Jhang-Li, Jhih-Hua
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資訊管理與財務金融系註：原資管所+財金所
;
Department of Information Management and Finance
Most websites are simultaneously supported by display advertising and contextual advertising. In this paper, we develop an economic model to examine the profitability of these two ad types in both a monopolistic market and duopolistic market, identifying the influence of impression benefit and click benefit. We find that in the duopolistic market a rival channel's professional ability to enhance a visitor's impression is beneficial to the channel offering contextual advertising. We also find that the strength of a search engine is limited in the duopolistic market; therefore, acquisition becomes a prime strategy to reveal the value of contextual advertising. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Pricing Web Advertisement: Display Ads VS Contextual Ads
(2007)
Li, Yung-Ming
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Jhang-Li, Jhih-Hua
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資訊管理與財務金融系註：原資管所+財金所
;
Department of Information Management and Finance
Most web sites provide display advertising and contextual advertising services simultaneously, which are the main ad formats in Internet. With multimedia format, the pricing of display ads is generally based on the occurrence of ad impressions. However targeting their customers more accurately, contextual ads are performance based advertisements and are charged only if one visitor clicks a client's appointed ad. In this paper, we develop an economic model to examine the pricing strategy, profitability, and social efficiency of these two heterogeneous web advertising channels, with respect to different market structures.
Reward mechanisms for P2P VoIP networks
(2010-06-01)
Li, Yung-Ming
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Jhang-Li, Jhih-Hua
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Cheng, Ding-Yuan
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資訊管理與財務金融系註：原資管所+財金所
;
Department of Information Management and Finance
As we have seen, P2P VoIP software, such as Skype, has emerged from the current generation of telecommunication systems. However, establishing communication applications based on P2P networks without considering the operational models of the Internet presents potential dangers. In this study, we treat a VoIP telephone conversation as a dynamic game and compare the ex post reward mechanism with the ex ante reward mechanism in forward versus discard and QoS routing. Our simulation results point out that the ex post reward mechanism is better than the ex ante reward mechanism in forward versus discard; however, the opposite holds true in QoS routing when the expected number of periods is sufficiently large. In addition, this study considers the reward mechanisms and the platform provider's benefit to find the optimal number of supernodes in a transmission path.