Browsing by Author "Kang, Chao-Chung"

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A new financial engineering model for analyzing the royalty of BOT projects: The Taiwan case
(2007)
Kang, Chao-Chung
;
Feng, Cheng-Min
;
Huang, Szu-Chi
;
運輸與物流管理系註：原交通所+運管所
;
Department of Transportation and Logistics Management
This paper uses the financial engineering concept to compare build, operate, and transfer (BOT) projects with non-BOT projects. The comparison reveals that there exists a difference in financial flow framework between BOT and non-BOT projects and that the benefit cost ratio (B/C) or self-liquidation ratio (SLR) cannot be used to analyze the financial plan although some earlier studies have used either of them to evaluate the financial feasibility of BOT projects. Moreover, this study construct a new financial investment evaluation model which includes the private construction cost ratio (PCCR), government construction cost ratio (GCCR), royalty, and government finance recovery ratio (GFRR) for analyzing the financial characters of BOT projects. In addition, this paper conducts a case study on the BOT concession of the Container Terminal in Taipei Port to find the solutions of PCCR, GCCR, royalty, and GFRR. Results of the case study show that the new BOT financial model could be used to interpret the financial characters of BOT projects.
A royalty negotiation model for BOT (build-operate-transfer) projects: The operational revenue-based model
(2011-11-01)
Kang, Chao-Chung
;
Feng, Cheng-Min
;
Kuo, Chiu-Yen
;
運輸與物流管理系註：原交通所+運管所
;
Department of Transportation and Logistics Management
Whilst few studies have explored royalty negotiations for build, operate and transfer (BOT) projects, some works have proposed numerous royalty formulas to evaluate royalty amounts or franchise fees for a BOT project. Despite this, the royalty negotiation process is one of the many critical negotiation items of a concession contract. This study not only developed a royalty negotiation model for BOT projects, but also developed the iterative algorithm for the BLP problem for the government and the private sector. In addition, the factors incorporated into the iterative algorithm for the BLP problem include the concession rate, learning rate, and the time value discount rate for both parties. Moreover, this paper conducted a case study of the Taipei Port Container Logistic BOT Project using LINGO and MATLAB programming. The results show that the two parties involved completed royalty negotiation at the sixth negotiation. The objective function value for lower-level programming was 1.062 and the government finance recovery rate for higher-level programming was 11.832. The findings show that the government can receive the royalty, which is calculated by using 0.012% of the operating revenue of this BOT project, from the concessionaire. Therefore, the royalty negotiation model based on the operating revenue developed herein; could be employed to explain the negotiation behavior. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
A Royalty Negotiation Model for BOT Projects: A Bi-level Programming Approach
(2008)
Kang, Chao-Chung
;
Feng, Cheng-Min
;
Kuo, Chiu-Yen
;
運輸與物流管理系註：原交通所+運管所
;
Department of Transportation and Logistics Management
This study develops the royalty negotiation model of BOT (Build, operate, and transfer) projects for government and private sector by Bi-level programming approach. There were few studies to explore the royalty negotiation about BOT projects; however, the royalty negotiation is one of many critical negotiation items of concession contract. This study not only develops royalty negotiation model for BOT projects, but also develops the heuristic algorithm for the Bi-level programming problem. The factors of concession rate, time value discount, learn rate and number of negotiation are incorporated into this algorithm. In addition, this paper conducted a case study with the Taipei Port Container Logistic BOT Project by the LINGO and MATLAB programming. Results show that two parties finish the royalty negotiation at the 6th negotiation and the profit index of concessionaire is 1.0621; the government finance recovery rate is 11.689. Therefore, the royalty negotiation model herein developed could be applied to explain the negotiation behavior.
Accounting for air pollution emissions and transport policy in the measurement of the efficiency and effectiveness of bus transits
(2020-05-27)
Kang, Chao-Chung
;
Feng, Cheng-Min
;
Liao, Bo-Ruei
;
Khan, Haider A.
;
運輸與物流管理系註：原交通所+運管所
This study presents a two-stage network performance evaluation model that determines the efficiency and effectiveness of bus transit systems. The model accounts for non-storable service features, undesirable outputs, and transport policy factors. The Taipei bus transit system is presented as an empirical case to measure the performance of bus transits with and without consideration of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and the transfer of riders. The results show that CO2 emissions and the transfer of riders are important factors for a performance evaluation model. Failure to include these results in an incomplete evaluation. Rather than focusing solely on marketable outputs, government agencies and managers must consider undesirable outputs or transport policy factors that relate to bus transits when measuring the efficiency and effectiveness of bus transits.
Comparison of royalty methods for build-operate-transfer projects from a negotiation perspective
(2012-07-01)
Kang, Chao-Chung
;
Feng, Cheng-Min
;
Kuo, Chiu-Yen
;
運輸與物流管理系註：原交通所+運管所
;
Department of Transportation and Logistics Management
This study constructs a royalty negotiation model for the bi-level programming (BLP) problem and develops a heuristic algorithm for solving the BLP problem. Concession rate, learning effect, and the time value discount rate are integrated into the proposed algorithm to reflect an authentic negotiation process. A case study is employed to simulate the negotiation behavior of two parties and alternative royalty strategies are discussed. Analytical results indicate that the two parties acquire the best negotiation result during the fifth negotiation. The operational revenue-based royalty model is more preferred by governments, while concessionaires favor more the operational output-based royalty model. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Efficiency evaluation of bus transit firms with and without consideration of environmental air-pollution emissions
(2017-01)
Kang, Chao-Chung
;
Khan, Haider A.
;
Feng, Cheng-Min
;
Wu, Chin-Chia
;
運輸與物流管理系註：原交通所+運管所
This study examines the technical efficiency and environmental efficiency of bus transit firms using the slack-based measures (SBM) and non-separable slack-based measures (NSSBM) models with and without considerations of desirable and undesirable outputs. A case study based on data from 12 bus transit firms for the years 2007 to 2011 was conducted. Empirical results show that technical efficiency was affected by environmental pollution constraints from 2007 to 2011. The study has more general theoretical implications for the externalities literature as well. (C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Risk measurement and risk identification for BOT projects: A multi-attribute utility approach
(2009-05-01)
Kang, Chao-Chung
;
Feng, Cheng-Min
;
運輸與物流管理系註：原交通所+運管所
;
Department of Transportation and Logistics Management
This paper aims to identify and assess the potential risks faced by private sectors in holding BOT projects through the risk assessment model developed herein. The multi-attribute utility function and aggregation utility are established using the multi-attribute utility theory to evaluate the risk state of each uncertainty, and in turn to determine whether such an uncertainty is a risk factor or not from the negotiator group's view point. This model shows that the uncertainty is regarded as a risk factor only when the aggregation utility value is less than the average aggregation utility value when the outcome, attribute, and states of a factor as well as its occurrence probability a real lindependent. A numerical example is also utilized to demonstrate the application of the developed risk assessment model. Results of the numerical example reveal that the concession period of a BOT project is the primary risk factor whereas the foreign exchange ratio is the secondary risk factor. Accordingly, the concession period dominates the negotiation results of BOT projects. (C) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Royalty Analysis for BOT Projects Based on The Negotiation Viewpoint
(2009)
Kang, Chao-Chung
;
Feng, Cheng-Min
;
Kuo, Chiu-Yen
;
運輸與物流管理系註：原交通所+運管所
;
Department of Transportation and Logistics Management
This study constructs three royalty negotiation models, including the lump-sum royalty, operational revenue-based royalty, and operational output-based royalty, using the bi-level programming approach. In addition, this paper also develops the iterative algorithm for bi-level programming problem for the government and the private sector. A number of factors were incorporated into this algorithm including concession rate, time value discount rate, learning rate and number of negotiations.
Using bi-level programming to analyze the royalty for private-public partnership projects: the operational quantity-based model
(2010)
Kang, Chao-Chung
;
Feng, Cheng-Min
;
Kuo, Chiu-Yen
;
運輸與物流管理系註：原交通所+運管所
;
Department of Transportation and Logistics Management
This paper develops a royalty negotiation model based on the operating quantity of Build, Operate, and Transfer (BOT) projects for both government and the private sector using a bi-level programming (BLP) approach. The royalty negotiation is one of many critical negotiation items of a concession contract. This study develops a royalty negotiation model to simulate the negotiation behavior of two parties, and derives the heuristic algorithm for the BLP problem. A number of factors are incorporated into this algorithm including the concession rate, the time value discount rate, the learning rate, and the number of negotiations. The paper includes a case study of the Taipei Port Container Logistic BOT Project. The results show that the two parties involved completed royalty negotiation at the sixth negotiation stage. The findings show that the government can receive a royalty from the concessionaire, calculated at 0.00386% of the operating quantity of this BOT project. Therefore, the royalty negotiation model developed here could be employed to explain negotiation behavior.