Browsing by Author "Lin, Chung-Yi"
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Item type:Item, A Cooperative Game-Theoretic Model in Cloud Storage Auditing(2020-01-01) ;Lin, Chung-Yi ;Tzeng, Wen-Guey ;資訊工程學系Department of Computer ScienceIn the traditional cloud storage auditing, users individually audit the cloud storage provider (CSP). However, users may pay the redundant auditing cost when they have similar auditing results. For example, a lot of users may get fail results when the CSP's service occurs accidents. In the worst case, the overall auditing cost linearly increases with the number of users. We propose a cooperative auditing model to let user share their auditing results in a friendship-based social network so that their overall auditing cost can be reduced. Furthermore, we design an auditing coalition game based on cooperative game theory, where not only users' individual interest but their entire benefit is c onsidered. We present two algorithms to find out an optimal way of forming auditing coalitions. The first algorithm determines an optimal coalition in one iteration. In the second algorithm, after iteratively adjusting users' trust relationships, users may change to join another coalition if they receive wrong auditing results. The results of the one-iteration experiment show that the more number of users, the more auditing cost reduction. Specifically, the auditing cost can be reduced by 96% with respect to the original non-cooperative auditing model. In the multi-iteration experiment, the accuracy of users' auditing results can be improved from 88% to 100%.Item type:Item, Game-theoretic Strategy Analysis for Data Reliability Management in Cloud Storage Systems(2014-01-01) ;Lin, Chung-Yi ;Tzeng, Wen-Guey ;資訊工程學系Department of Computer ScienceReplication is the simplest way to achieve data reliability in cloud storage systems. Nevertheless, replication incurs storage overhead to the cloud storage provider (CSP). To verify CSPs\' reliability, users can audit CSPs with remote data integrity checking. However, the auditing incurs cost to users. Thus, CSPs and users involve a conflict situation, where users prefer less auditing and CSPs prefer less replication. In this paper, we provide a game-theoretic analysis to get optimal strategies for users and CSP. We use the pricing strategy adopted by Amazon S3 to explain our analysis. Our results show that a user should audit if CSP\'s reduced data copies are less than 1.81. If CSP believes lower user\'s staying probability, it should provide more discount or copies. According to this study, a user has the criterion for paying less auditing cost and CSP makes the reliability and pricing policy to keep users in business.