Browsing by Author "Lin, Yan-Shu"

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Bundling strategy and product differentiation
(2013-04-01)
Chung, Hui-Ling
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Lin, Yan-Shu
;
Hu, Jin-Li
;
經營管理研究所
;
Institute of Business and Management
The existing literature shows that a decrease in the degree of substitutability increases a monopoly's incentive to bundle. This paper in addition takes into account competition in the second product market and then re-examines how intra-brand and inter-brand product differentiations affect the incentive to bundle. In order to formally examine the above conjectures, this research builds up a two-firm, two-product model in which product 1 (monopoly product) is produced only by the bundling firm and product 2 (competing product) is produced by both firms. The analysis shows that under both Bertrand and Cournot competitions the incentive to bundle does not necessarily increase with the degree of intra-brand differentiation, while it strictly decreases with the degree of inter-brand differentiation. Moreover, under Bertrand competition bundling always decreases consumer surplus, but may increase the competitor's profit and social surplus. Under Cournot competition bundling always reduces the opponent's profit and social welfare, but may increase consumer surplus.
BUNDLING WITH QUALITY CHOICE
(2014-12-01)
Chung, Hui-Ling
;
Chen, Hung-Yi
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Hu, Jin-Li
;
Lin, Yan-Shu
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經營管理研究所
Antitrust authorities consider commodity bundling as an extension of monopoly power to other markets which harms consumers. This paper analyzes quality competition and its effect on consumer surplus for the case of commodity bundling by a multi-product firm in a vertically differentiated industry. When the firm bundles a high quality good, we show that bundling negatively affects the quality of a competing good, consumer surplus, and welfare. When the firm bundles a low quality good instead, bundling raises the quality of a competing good, enhances consumer surplus, and may increase the welfare.
FDI and Outsourcing in a Service Industry: Welfare Effects of Liberalising Trade and Investment
(2014-06-01)
Lu, Te-Cheng
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Lin, Yan-Shu
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Hu, Jin-Li
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經營管理研究所
;
Institute of Business and Management
This study examines a foreign firm\'s entry decision and its effects on the host country\'s welfare in a model with a composite good in which both commodity and service generate utility for consumers. Along with the commodity it produces, a producer can provide the service by itself or outsource the service. The result shows that the incentive for foreign direct investment (FDI) in the service sector increases under liberalising trade in the final-good market. Moreover, there exist policy combinations of trade and investment liberalisation, whereby the domestic firms\' profitability is traded off with the host country\'s social welfare when the foreign firm provides a service through FDI or through outsourcing, respectively. Finally, the welfare after simultaneously liberalising trade and investment is not necessarily greater than that under autarky.
FDI and Outsourcing in a Service Industry: Welfare Effects of Liberalising Trade and Investment
(2014-06-01)
Lu, Te-Cheng
;
Lin, Yan-Shu
;
Hu, Jin-Li
;
經營管理研究所
;
Institute of Business and Management
This study examines a foreign firm's entry decision and its effects on the host country's welfare in a model with a composite good in which both commodity and service generate utility for consumers. Along with the commodity it produces, a producer can provide the service by itself or outsource the service. The result shows that the incentive for foreign direct investment (FDI) in the service sector increases under liberalising trade in the final-good market. Moreover, there exist policy combinations of trade and investment liberalisation, whereby the domestic firms' profitability is traded off with the host country's social welfare when the foreign firm provides a service through FDI or through outsourcing, respectively. Finally, the welfare after simultaneously liberalising trade and investment is not necessarily greater than that under autarky.
LOCATION CHOICE AND PATENT LICENSING
(2013-03-01)
Lin, Yan-Shu
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Hu, Jin-Li
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Xia, Peng-Chiao
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經營管理研究所
;
Institute of Business and Management
This paper studies the patent licensing decision when firms can endogenously choose their locations. If the insider patentee is the location leader, the royalty is not necessarily the best method of licensing. No licensing can be the best method for an insider patentee with a sufficiently high degree of innovation, but fixed-fee is always the worst. However, if the non-innovating firm is the location leader, the royalty licensing is always the best method; moreover, the fixed-fee licensing (no licensing) is the second best method if the degree of innovation is relatively small (sufficiently large).
MIXED COMPETITION AND PATENT LICENSING
(2015-12-01)
Chang, Ray-Yun
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Lin, Yan-Shu
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Hu, Jin-Li
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交大名義發表
;
National Chiao Tung University
This paper studies the patent licensing decision of an insider patentee when two firms engage in a mixed (Cournot-Bertrand or Bertrand-Cournot) competition where one firm adopts the quantity strategy while the other uses the price strategy and vice versa. If either the fixed fee or royalty is applied, then the licensor prefers the fixed fee when the licensor takes the quantity strategy, while the licensee uses the price strategy (Cournot-Bertrand). If the two-part tariff is applied, then the two-part tariff is more likely to be adopted by the licensor under Cournot-Bertrand than under Bertrand-Cournot competition.
MIXED COMPETITION AND PATENT LICENSING
(2015-12)
Chang, Ray-Yun
;
Lin, Yan-Shu
;
Hu, Jin-Li
;
交大名義發表
;
National Chiao Tung University
This paper studies the patent licensing decision of an insider patentee when two firms engage in a mixed (Cournot-Bertrand or Bertrand-Cournot) competition where one firm adopts the quantity strategy while the other uses the price strategy and vice versa. If either the fixed fee or royalty is applied, then the licensor prefers the fixed fee when the licensor takes the quantity strategy, while the licensee uses the price strategy (Cournot-Bertrand). If the two-part tariff is applied, then the two-part tariff is more likely to be adopted by the licensor under Cournot-Bertrand than under Bertrand-Cournot competition.
Subcontracting bargaining power and the trade policy
(2019-01-01)
Tsao, Ku-Chu
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Wu, Shih-Jye
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Hu, Jin-Li
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Lin, Yan-Shu
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經營管理研究所
In this paper, we consider that the split of surplus from a subcontracting deal depends on the relative bargaining powers of domestic and foreign firms. The finding shows that a domestic optimal export policy is a tax (subsidy) if the bargaining power of the domestic firm is sufficiently small (large). We also demonstrate that a domestic firm's higher bargaining power increases (may decrease) domestic profit if the export policy is exogenous (endogenous). In the presence of an outsider option, the domestic optimal export policy will be threatened by the outsider option if the domestic firm's bargaining power is sufficiently small, and thus a large bargaining power increases the optimal export tax. At the same time, the foreign firm may still subcontract to the domestic firm even if the domestic firm has a higher total marginal cost of the intermediate good than the outsider option.
The Choice of Prices versus Quantities under Outsourcing
(2018-07-01)
Chang, Ray-Yun
;
Hu, Jin-Li
;
Lin, Yan-Shu
;
經營管理研究所
;
Institute of Business and Management
This paper establishes a duopoly model with product differentiation and outsourcing in order to analyze the equilibrium competition strategies (choice of prices versus quantities) when the outsourcer outsources its intermediate good to a final product competitor. We show that: (1) both firms choose the quantity strategy when the cost efficiency of the subcontractor is low; (2) the choice of competition strategy is the price strategy for the subcontractor and the quantity strategy for the outsourcer when the cost efficiency of the subcontractor is moderate; (3) both firms choose the price strategy when the cost efficiency of the subcontractor is sufficiently high.