Browsing by Author "Liu, Chih-Liang"
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Item type:Item, Committee Independence and Financial Institution Performance during the 2007-08 Credit Crunch: Evidence from a Multi-country Study(2011-09-01) ;Yeh, Yin-Hua ;Chung, Huimin ;Liu, Chih-Liang ;資訊管理與財務金融系 註:原資管所+財金所Department of Information Management and FinanceManuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: Using the data of the 20 largest financial institutions from G8 countries, we explore whether the performance is higher for financial institutions with more independent directors on different committees during the 2007-08 financial crisis. We also examine the moderating effect of a country-level civil law dummy and firm-level excessive risk-taking behaviors on the independence-performance relationships. Research Findings/Insights: The empirical evidence shows that the performance during the crisis period is higher for financial institutions with more independent directors on auditing and risk committees. The influence of committee independence on the performance is particularly stronger for civil law countries. In addition, the independence-performance relationships are more significant in financial institutions with excessive risk-taking behaviors. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our findings complement existing works to partially resolve the independence-performance relationship controversies by exploring the independence of different committees. The moderating effects of civil law countries and excessive risk-taking firms further address the governance environment's role in the effectiveness of director independence. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our results provide important policy implications for financial institutions. The regulation authorities should enhance regulation compliance to improve director independence, particularly for auditing and risk committees in banking industry. Independent directors in the banking industry are supposed to put more emphasis on excessive risk-taking behaviors, as the financial institutions profit from risk-bearing earnings.Item type:Item, Comprehensive Disclosure of Compensation and Firm Value: The Case of Policy Reforms in an Emerging Market(2010-11-01) ;Sheu, Her-Jiun ;Chung, Huimin ;Liu, Chih-Liang ;交大名義發表資訊管理與財務金融系 註:原資管所+財金所We set out in the present study to examine the market value of comprehensive disclosure of information relating to the compensation paid to directors and executives. Under the theory of self selection, firms with higher levels of board independence will tend to provide comprehensive disclosure of compensation, thereby leading to lower agency conflicts. Since the authorities in Taiwan chose to adopt a policy of gradual enforcement of compensation disclosure, firms are provided with discretion with regard to any greater levels of transparency that they may choose to provide. We therefore exploit this unique natural experimental setting to examine the effects of compensation disclosure on market value. The evidence indicates that the market provides a higher valuation only to those firms which elect to voluntarily disclose comprehensive information on their compensation practices. However, we also find that even where such disclosure is in excess of the minimum mandatory requirements, lower levels of transparency in the overall disclosure of compensation practices are of very little help with regard to the creation of market value.Item type:Item, Interest rate risk propagation: Evidence from the credit crunch(2014-04-01) ;Yang, Hsin-Feng ;Liu, Chih-Liang ;Chou, Ray Yeutien ;經營管理研究所Institute of Business and ManagementDuring the 2007-2009 financial crisis, US subprime mortgage risk exposures led to severe liquidity problems in several other foreign markets. Such risk contagion was caused by enormous changes in interest rates. Although risk contagion has been investigated by several literatures, the magnitude of propagated interest rate risk around global financial markets remains unexplored. Therefore, this study quantifies the degree to which the increased credit risk within the US financial system propagated to the European markets' liquidity risks. Specifically, using a conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR) model, we quantitatively measure interest rate risk of a European country, by looking at the upside risk in distribution of changes in interest rate. And such propagation risk measure considers additional value-at-risk conditional on the interest rate movements in the US. The results show significantly positive differences between European country's value-at-risk conditional on the US financial markets being in a normal or distressed state. This propagating effect increased from 2007, and was particularly pronounced in the 2008-2009. In addition, the interest rate risk contagion is especially severe for some countries in the Euro regions with greater sovereign debt problems. Hence our result foretells the deterioration of the European sovereign debt crisis which started to unfold in 2010. Our work supplements the literature by successfully quantifying the magnitude of additional interest rate risk conditional on risk exposure from external sectors. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Item type:Item, Interest rate risk propagation: Evidence from the credit crunch(2014-04-01) ;Yang, Hsin-Feng ;Liu, Chih-Liang ;Chou, Ray Yeutien ;經營管理研究所Institute of Business and ManagementDuring the 2007-2009 financial crisis, US subprime mortgage risk exposures led to severe liquidity problems in several other foreign markets. Such risk contagion was caused by enormous changes in interest rates. Although risk contagion has been investigated by several literatures, the magnitude of propagated interest rate risk around global financial markets remains unexplored. Therefore, this study quantifies the degree to which the increased credit risk within the US financial system propagated to the European markets\' liquidity risks. Specifically, using a conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR) model, we quantitatively measure interest rate risk of a European country, by looking at the upside risk in distribution of changes in interest rate. And such propagation risk measure considers additional value-at-risk conditional on the interest rate movements in the US. The results show significantly positive differences between European country\'s value-at-risk conditional on the US financial markets being in a normal or distressed state. This propagating effect increased from 2007, and was particularly pronounced in the 2008-2009. In addition, the interest rate risk contagion is especially severe for some countries in the Euro regions with greater sovereign debt problems. Hence our result foretells the deterioration of the European sovereign debt crisis which started to unfold in 2010. Our work supplements the literature by successfully quantifying the magnitude of additional interest rate risk conditional on risk exposure from external sectors. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Item type:Item, Ownership concentration and bank risk: international study on acquisitions(2018-01-01) ;Liu, Chih-Liang ;Yeh, Yin-Hua ;資訊管理與財務金融系 註:原資管所+財金所Department of Information Management and FinanceThis paper explores the effects of different types of bank ownership concentration on changes in bank risk during acquisition years. Using multi-country data from 2000 to 2006, during which market failures caused by various crises and government interventions are less influential to acquisition decisions, we collect 505 banking acquisition deals from 23 countries to examine which type of ownership concentration (such as financial intermediary, capital investor, non-financial, and state ownership) brings larger changes to an acquirer's risk from pre-acquisition year to post-acquisition year (including non-performing loans, capital adequacy ratio, loan loss reserve, and credit rating). The empirical analyses show that acquirer banks with a concentration of shares owned by financial intermediaries and non-financial firms experience larger risk changes during acquisition years. In contrast, the risk changes of acquirer banks with a concentration of capital investors and state ownership are lower. Robustness checks from the random effect estimation, instrumental variables model, reverse causality, and different subsamples of (non-)U.S. or different levels of regulation enforcement confirm these results.