Browsing by Author "Shu, Pei-Gi"
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Item type:Item, Affiliation and professionalism: Alternative perspectives on decomposing the board structures of financial institutions(2014-07-01) ;Yeh, Yin-Hua ;Shu, Pei-Gi ;Chiang, Tsui-Lin ;資訊管理與財務金融系 註:原資管所+財金所Department of Information Management and FinanceMost financial institutions around the world are under concentrated ownership. To protect rents and the private benefits of control, controlling owners prefer to include more affiliated members on their boards. This study empirically examines financial institutions in Taiwan a country that harbors both firms with controlling shareholders and pyramidal groups and its results verify the aforementioned postulation. We find that board affiliation is positively associated with control rights, cash flow rights and the control/cash flow deviation associated with controlling owners. In contrast, professionalism can disentangle controlling owners\' motives, as it is positively associated with the controlling-owner cash flow/control rights ratio and negatively correlated with the control/cash flow deviation. The results support the incentive effect associated with controlling owners. Moreover, the information argument provides auxiliary explanations for how boards are structured. Family is a catalyst for the bias toward lower levels of board professionalism. Finally, whereas board professionalism is positively correlated with stock returns during a financial crisis, board affiliation has a negative correlation. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Item type:Item, Managerial Overconfidence and Share Repurchases(2013-03-01) ;Shu, Pei-Gi ;Yeh, Yin-Hua ;Chiang, Tsui-Lin ;Hung, Jui-Yi資訊管理與財務金融系 註:原資管所+財金所Following prior studies, we use keywords in press portrayals to gauge managerial overconfidence. We hypothesize that managerial overconfidence is related to a manager's perception that the firm is undervalued. Results from 2744 share repurchase programs launched by 783 listed firms in Taiwan confirm this hypothesis. We find that managerial overconfidence is positively correlated with the intensity of share repurchasing, which is measured by scale, execution, frequency, and the difference between the announced price and post-execution price. Moreover, the programs launched by overconfident managers were not undervalued and therefore were associated with reduced post-announcement returns.Item type:Item, Political connections, corporate governance and preferential bank loans(2013-01-01) ;Yeh, Yin-Hua ;Shu, Pei-Gi ;Chiu, Shean-Bii ;資訊管理與財務金融系 註:原資管所+財金所Department of Information Management and FinanceThe presidential election in Taiwan during 2000 resulted in the first political changeover in more than fifty years from the ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In 2004, the KMT was expected to win, but eventually lost to the DPP. We use these two exogenous events to investigate three issues: how political connections are related to preferential bank loans, how the entrenched position of the ruling party affects the types of preferential bank loans and how corporate governance is related to preferential bank loans. We find that KMT-connected (DPP-connected) firms were associated with higher (lower) abnormal returns before the 2004 election. This pattern of returns was reversed after the unexpected result. Moreover, we find that political connections were positively correlated with preferential bank loans. However, the types of preferential bank loans differed between KMT-connected and DPP-connected firms due to differences in the entrenched power of the ruling party. Finally, we find that corporate governance is negatively correlated with preferential bank loans, probably because firms with good corporate governance have more alternative financial sources. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.