Browsing by Author "Wu, Shih-Jye"

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MARKET STRUCTURE, PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY, AND PRIVATIZATION
(2014-06-01)
Yang, Ya-Po
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Wu, Shih-Jye
;
Hu, Jin-Li
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經營管理研究所
;
Institute of Business and Management
In order to analyze the optimal degree of privatizing an upstream public firm, this paper sets up a vertically related market that consists of an upstream mixed oligopoly with one public firm and m private firms and a downstream oligopoly with n private firms. The major findings of this paper are as follows: If the marginal production cost of input increases slowly (rapidly), then the optimal degree for privatizing a public upstream firm increases (decreases) with the number of downstream firms. If the marginal production cost of input increases moderately, then the optimal degree for privatizing the public upstream firm first increases and then decreases with the number of downstream firms. If the marginal production cost of input is constant, then the optimal degree for privatizing a public upstream firm always increases with the number of downstream firms.
Subcontracting bargaining power and the trade policy
(2019-01-01)
Tsao, Ku-Chu
;
Wu, Shih-Jye
;
Hu, Jin-Li
;
Lin, Yan-Shu
;
經營管理研究所
In this paper, we consider that the split of surplus from a subcontracting deal depends on the relative bargaining powers of domestic and foreign firms. The finding shows that a domestic optimal export policy is a tax (subsidy) if the bargaining power of the domestic firm is sufficiently small (large). We also demonstrate that a domestic firm's higher bargaining power increases (may decrease) domestic profit if the export policy is exogenous (endogenous). In the presence of an outsider option, the domestic optimal export policy will be threatened by the outsider option if the domestic firm's bargaining power is sufficiently small, and thus a large bargaining power increases the optimal export tax. At the same time, the foreign firm may still subcontract to the domestic firm even if the domestic firm has a higher total marginal cost of the intermediate good than the outsider option.