Real-Option Valuation of Build- Operate-Transfer Infrastructure Projects under Performance Bonding
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日期
2014-05-01
類型
系所
期刊名稱
JOURNAL OF CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT
卷期與頁次
第 140 卷第 5 期
ISSN
0733-9364
語言
英文
摘要
This study assesses the effect of performance bonding on the valuation of a build-operate-transfer (BOT) project by extending the classical Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) call option model. As common features in BOT contracts, a performance bond is a penalty imposed on concessionaires who exercise contractual rights to terminate participation in a project. In the real-option context, termination rights grant concessionaires the flexibility in managing market uncertainties that can increase the valuation of an infrastructure project, but the penalty impairs this flexibility and reduces valuations. A case study numerically illustrates the BSM model and indicates that performance bonding can destroy the flexibility and project valuations inherent in termination rights even when the penalty is moderate. Balancing performance bonds and termination rights is necessary because both are important in establishing and maintaining long-term contractual relationships in privatized BOT infrastructure projects.
關鍵詞
BuildOperateTransferInfrastructurePrivate sectorBuild-operate-transferPerformance bondReal optionInfrastructure privatizationValuationConcession contract網址
所屬典藏
期刊論文引用此條目
Huang, Y.-L., & Pi, C.-C. (2014). Real-Option Valuation of Build- Operate-Transfer Infrastructure Projects under Performance Bonding. JOURNAL OF CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT, 140(5). https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0000821
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永久網址:https://ir.lib.nycu.edu.tw/handle/11536/24203