限制員工權利新股制度對企業績效及盈餘管理之影響

Abstract

過去台灣研究鮮少探討限制員工權利新股制度對企業績效的影響，且美國研究亦少討 論限制型股票權利 (restricted stock units) 及限制型股票薪酬 (restricted stock awards) 的特性。 本研究旨在探討與績效連結之限制員工權利新股制度對企業績效及盈餘管理之影響。研究結 果顯示，與績效連結之限制員工權利新股制度提供經理人誘因去改善企業績效；然而，不論 係定義盈餘管理為實質盈餘管理抑或是應計盈餘管理，與績效連結之限制員工權利新股制度 和盈餘管理行為間都沒有關連性。

The literature has rarely investigated the effect of restricted stock awards on firm performance, with even studies in the U.S. not often discussing their characteristics or those of restricted stock units. This study thus investigates the relationship between the adoption of restricted stock awards tied to performance on both firm performance and earnings management. The empirical results show that adopting restricted stock awards tied to performance provides executives with an incentive to increase firm performance. However, no matter if we define earnings management as real earnings management or accruals management, there is no correlation between the adoption of restricted stock awards tied to performance and earnings management.