最適資本結構、策略競爭與經理人薪酬：實質選擇權法

Abstract

本計畫嘗試建立一個實質選擇權模型，其中寡占產業內公司之投資與融資決策係由經理 人所決定，而經理人所作之決策與產業內各公司之經理人薪酬(含現金與股票薪酬)息息 相關。因此，我們可以探討產業內資本結構、商品市場競爭與經理人薪酬間之交互關係。 本計畫預期對相關文獻有下列三項貢獻。首先，我們可以探討經理人薪酬(商品市場競 爭)對公司最適資本結構與商品市場競爭(經理人薪酬)關係之影響。其次，我們可以分 析最適投資與融資決策之互動關係，對寡占(對稱或不對稱)市場中企業最適經理人薪酬 合約之影響。最後，我們可以探討在實質選擇權賽局(例如：專利權競賽、技術採用、 新商品推出或策略併購等)中，各公司經理人薪酬對公司角色及最適投資與融資決策之 影響。

This project attempts to build a real options model where the managers are in charge of the firms’ investment and financing decisions in an oligopoly. The decisions by the manager are strongly relevant to the offered compensation consisting of cash salary and ownership shares within the industry. We can therefore examine the interdependent relationships among capital structure, product market competition and executive compensation in an industry. This project is expected to contribute to related literature in the following three areas. First, we can investigate how executive compensation (product market competition) affects the relationship between optimal capital structure and product market competition (executive compensation). Next, we can particularly scrutinize the impact of the interaction between optimal financing and investment decisions on optimal executive compensation design in an oligopoly (symmetric or asymmetric) industry. Finally, we can analyze the effect of executive compensation on the roles and optimal investment and financing decisions in a real options game (e.g., patents races, technology adoptions, new product introductions, strategic merger and acquisitions and so on).