Price Strategies between a Dominant Retailer and Manufacturers

Abstract

Supply chain-related game theoretical applications have been discussed for decades. This research accounts for the emergence of a dominant retailer, and the retailer Stackelberg pricing models of distribution channels. Research in the channel pricing game may use different definitions of pricing decision variables. In this research, we pay attentions to the retailer Stackelberg pricing game, and discuss the effects when choosing different decision variables. According the literature it was shown that the strategies between channel members depend critically on the form of the demand function. Two different demand forms - linear and non-linear - will be considered in our numerical example respectively. Our major finding is the outcomes are not relative to manufacturers' pricing decisions but to the retailer's pricing decision and choosing percentage margin as retailer's decision variable is the best strategy for the retailer but worst for manufacturers. The numerical results show that it is consistence between linear and non-linear demand form.