Different pay-performance sensitivity in family firms: A perspective of the family incentive alignment hypothesis
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國立陽明交通大學 經營管理研究所
Institute of Business and Magement, National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University
Institute of Business and Magement, National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University
DOI
10.3966/102873102021124102001
Abstract
本研究以台灣 2012 年至 2016 年的上市櫃家族企業為研究樣本。本研 究探討家族企業的非家族成員經理人的薪酬績效敏感性是否比家族成員經理人更敏感，本研究並進一步測試家族成員持股之調節效果。本研究也考量 公司績效表現好壞，及更改公司績效指標對於前述議題之影響。本研究發現 非家族成員經理人的薪酬績效敏感性比家族成員經理人較不敏感。然而，當 家族成員持股比例越高，則非家族成員經理人的薪酬績效敏感性比家族成員 經理人更敏感。再者，當公司績效表現較好時，也會讓非家族成員經理人的 薪酬績效敏感性比家族成員經理人更敏感。本文研究結果可以補充家族企業 相關文獻的不足並作為實務界參考之用。
This research uses Taiwanese listed family firms from 2012 to 2016 as the data to examine whether the compensation of non-family managers is more sensitive to firm performance than that of family managers. In addition, this research tests the moderating effect of family member ownership and considers the impacts of company performance as well as different measurements for such performance on the aforementioned issues. This study finds that the compensation of non-family managers is less sensitive to firm performance than that of family managers, but if the percentage of family members’ shareholdings is higher, then the compensation of non-family managers is more sensitive to firm performance than that of family managers. Furthermore, better company performance also causes the compensation of non-family managers to be more sensitive to firm performance than that of family managers. The results of this study complement the existing family firm literature and serve as a reference for practitioners.
This research uses Taiwanese listed family firms from 2012 to 2016 as the data to examine whether the compensation of non-family managers is more sensitive to firm performance than that of family managers. In addition, this research tests the moderating effect of family member ownership and considers the impacts of company performance as well as different measurements for such performance on the aforementioned issues. This study finds that the compensation of non-family managers is less sensitive to firm performance than that of family managers, but if the percentage of family members’ shareholdings is higher, then the compensation of non-family managers is more sensitive to firm performance than that of family managers. Furthermore, better company performance also causes the compensation of non-family managers to be more sensitive to firm performance than that of family managers. The results of this study complement the existing family firm literature and serve as a reference for practitioners.