財經犯罪與共犯理論之再思考

Abstract

當代財經犯罪具有結構性、國際性、長期性等特質，且行為人多為白領高階，利用組織體為掩蔽，運用其權勢，於組織內部聚合共犯，誘使內部人員違背職務進行舞弊，於組織外部結交公部門，以利益輸送方式滲入政府體系，從管制面消解犯罪阻力，並透過金融市場，結合金融、會計、法律等專業人士之利，以實踐犯行。因此牽涉層級極廣，上自政府高官、公司治理高層及專業的會計、法律人士，下至公司低階職員及企業外提供帳戶掩飾不法所得之人均可能同屬一犯罪結構之內。龐大的犯罪結構，對社會影響既深且廣。台灣近年即因多起重大財經犯罪，由於眾多政經人士涉案之故，國內交易環境及經濟秩序遭到破壞，嚴重牽連台灣的產業競爭力。 由於犯罪結構龐大，而複數行為人包括公務員、高階經理人、專業人士、低階職員及人頭戶等等，又各有其獨特之犯罪態樣，對犯罪實踐有不等之貢獻，刑法如何判斷個別行為人的可罰性，以給予不同程度之非難？是財經犯罪矯治政策首要解決之問題。然我國實務對於共犯區分較不細緻，正犯、共犯區分標準各式學說並陳，並無明確的判斷標準可循。尤有甚者，一旦涉及共犯結構底下的義務犯及身分犯問題時，爭議更大。然為充分評價各身分之行為人的犯罪態樣，細緻的共犯類型劃分是首要之急，而在龐大的財經共犯結構底下，身分犯、義務犯之問題亦有研究之必要。再者，我國學說理論向來著重於共犯成立之抽象基礎理論探討，較少分析共犯理論在具體型態犯罪的適用，亦缺乏類型化研究，本研究希望能就此部份有所貢獻。 而另一方面，針對不同犯行給予程度不等之刑罰，並藉由刑罰的壓力迫使企業修正公司治理對策及建立防弊機制是財經犯罪防制的重要政策。美國早已針對財經犯罪訂定明確之量刑計算標準，針對行為人的身分、犯行、吹哨者及公司是否依一定標準建立適當的防弊措施等因素，計算行為人應受之刑，以評價不等之犯行，並求企業內自主性不法防制機制的建立。尤其是吹哨者的保護問題，藉由量刑上給予吹哨者保障，政府較可掌握突破組織性的金融犯罪的罪證，然我國對於吹哨者之保障並未若美國完整，這是我國對抗財經犯罪措施的重大疏漏。本研究欲藉由實務累積之眾多案件，觀察我國法院量刑考量因素，並參考他國之建制，以求明確之刑罰標準，以催生我國他律性及自律型的防弊文化。 最後，剝奪犯罪所得，削弱犯罪誘因是財經犯罪的重要防制機制之一，然我國沒收法治寬鬆，沒收客體範圍狹窄，並無法確實剝奪財經犯罪行為之犯罪所得，同時囿於沒收客體狹窄之故，保全沒收財產措施亦不能發揮原有機能，復以我國刑罰不及法人，然結構性之財經犯罪，常以法人作為遮掩犯行及犯罪所得的工具，然而一旦犯罪所得落於法人名下，我國刑法幾無追及之可能。這將使犯罪行為人心存僥倖，並不利財經犯罪之預防。如何建制合理的沒收機制，亦是本研究探討重心。

Modern financial crime is a structuralized crime which involves the most influential and powerful people in our society. Defendants of such crimes are usually high-rank corporate officers who have not only the power to manipulate their employees to participate the crime, but also the financial resources to lure lawyers and accountants and to bribe public officials to avoid administrative restrictions. Therefore, financial crimes often involve corruption of both private and public sectors which erodes the order of the financial market and deters the development of a nation. The purpose of this research is to cope with the legal issues that had been brought up by the financial crimes recently occurred in Taiwan. One of the most controversial issues is how to apply the complicity theory to a complex financial crime and how to evaluate the contribution of each of the participants involved in the crime. Inherited from the Continental System, the current complicity theory adopted by Taiwan involves only two categories: abettors and accessories. The complicity of financial crimes has exposed the vagueness and insufficiency of our system. This research plans to introduce the complicity theories adopted by the United States Criminal Law, which assesses offenders by three standards: first/second degree, accessory before/after the fact, and conspirator. Its delicate complicity theory makes it easier to evaluate the diverse type of offences in financial and economic crimes. Moreover, this project intends to set up a sentencing guideline for Taiwan. In the United States, the Congress organized a detailed sentencing guideline for financial and economic crime. It weighs the offences, corporation’s anti-illegal measures, offender’s identity and whistle-blowing. Via the guideline, the United States creates a sophisticated but effect anti-financial and economic crime policy. It helps the government go through the criminal structure and enhance self-discipline in corporations. Even though it is not necessary to follow the exact US model, it would still be helpful to learn the U.S. experience for Taiwan to fight against financial and economic crime. The last issue in this project is about forfeiture. Forfeiture law has always been regarded as the key point to reduce offenders’incentive to commit a property crime. Taiwan’s forfeiture law, however, is restricted on a small category of subjects and fails to achieve that goal. The Unites States has two effective weapons to cope with property crimes—criminal forfeiture and civil forfeiture. It may provide guidance for Taiwan to reconstruct our forfeiture law.