專業責任保險制度對投資、會計師法律責任及審計行為影響之研究

Abstract

本研究參考Hillegeist(1999)模式，加入專業責任保險機制，以分析性方法，探討會計師專業責任保險制度對投資、會計師法律責任及其審計行爲之影響。均衡分析結果顯示，投資人之投資水準在有專業責任保險下低於無專業責任保險之情境。因爲在有專業責任保險機制下，投資人從會計師所獲得的損害賠償金額會較少。會計師的審計品質，在專業責任保險機制下，如損害賠償金額有上限，則其審計品質將低於無專業責任保險機制。但是，審計品質會因加重會計師的法律責任、提高對會計師的求償金額、或增加會計師在保險理賠時的支付比率而加強。另外，在有專業責任保險機制下，如限定會計師的損害賠償金額爲公費的一定倍數，則投資人的投資行爲會更趨於保守，會計師的查核努力也會降低。惟如強化司法人員的會計與審計相關專業素養，及加重會計師在審計失敗中所負的責任，則會計師的審計品質將會提升。

This research explores the impact of professional insurance on investment, independent auditors' legal liability, and their audit behavior using an analytical approach based on Hillegeist (1999) model. We analyze two regimes, settings with/without professional insurance, and examine how they affect investment level and audit quality. The results show that different regimes lead to divergent investment level and audit quality. In the situation with professional insurance, both the investment level and audit quality are lower than those of the regime without professional insurance, largely because of the ceiling on the auditors' loss payment. However, putting more legal liability on the auditors and raising the self-payment ratio of professional insurance could enhance the investment level and audit quality.