「消費金融債務的協商機制」對金融機構股價表現之衝擊

Abstract

本研究旨在探討民國94年10月台灣爆發卡債問題後，政府推動的「消費金融案件債務協商機制」是否對金融機構的股價表現產生衝擊。根據實證結果得知，金融控股公司和銀行受到的衝擊遠大於證券和保險公司；信用卡發卡量最高的金融機構受到的衝擊，則顯著高於發卡量中等和最低者；現金卡放款餘額高的金融機構承受的衝擊，也高於此類業務授信量中等和最低者；當配對比較不同類別的金融機構，發現此協商機制的推動，導致彼此的競爭態勢迥異，「債務協商機制」明顯造成金融機構不同程度的衝擊。至於衝擊程度不一的原因，則與債務協商發生時，金融機構是否出現下列情況有關：信用卡餘額之市占率很高，最近三個月打消許多呆帳，卻又提存很少損失準備，分行家數不多，以及持卡人的額度動用率呈現頗高成長的銀行。這些類型的銀行在協商時期的累積異常報酬均為負值，顯示其對協商事件的暴險程度較高。

The purpose of this research is to discuss whether or not the government promotion of the ”Consumer Debt Negotiation Mechanism” would impact financial institutions' stock price after the explosion of the Taiwan card-debt problems on October of 2005. According to empirical results, financial holding companies and banks were impacted far more than securities and insurance companies. Financial institutions that issued the highest volume of credit cards were impacted significantly more than those that issued moderate and the lowest volume of credit cards. Financial institutions that gave more cash card loans were impacted more than those that gave moderate and the least cash card loans. When compared to different kinds of financial institutions, the promotion of this negotiation mechanism was discovered to cause vastly different mutual competition attitudes. Obviously, the Debt Negotiation Mechanism caused different degrees of impact on financial institutions. The different degrees of impact were due to whether or not the following situations would occur to the financial institution when debt negotiation happened: (1) The market share percentage of the credit card balance was very high. (2) In the past three months, many bad debts were written off, but very little loss preparation was deposited. (3) Not enough number of branches. (4) Banks with overly high growth of the amount draw-down rate of the cardholders. As for these kinds of banks, their cumulative abnormal returns showed negative values during the negotiation period. This revealed that they had a higher degree of risks in negotiation events.