融資限制對公司盈餘管理影響之研究

Abstract

財務報表為外部投資人與公司傳遞資訊的工具，為了降低外界的疑慮及取得公司所需資金，經理人必須重視財務報表的表達，甚至進行盈餘管理以美化財務報表。融資限制公司除了較高的財務風險外，比低融資限制的公司有更高的資金需求壓力，也因此更具盈餘管理的動機。過去相關文獻多以事件研究為導向，觀察公司是否因資金需求而進行盈餘管理。而本文的目的除了觀察融資限制公司是否因資金需求而有顯著的盈餘管理行為外，也希望瞭解不同的融資限制成因是否會導致不同的盈餘管理型態。本文實證結果發現融資限制公司確實會以盈餘管理來降低資訊不對稱所帶來的負面影響，當將成長機會納入考慮後，發現融資限制且低成長的公司有顯著的避免損失行為，而融資限制且高成長的公司則有盈餘平穩化的型態，目的可能是為了降低資金成本以及傳遞公司訊息；對於低融資限制的公司而言，盈餘管理型態普遍不顯著，但小規模公司則不論成長機會高低皆呈現積極的會計策略型態，可能原因為經理人藉由操縱應計項目達成盈餘目標、獎酬計畫或掩飾投資無效率等目的。

Financial statements are the means of communication to outsiders of the corporations. To reduce outside skepticism and raise funds, managers place importance on financial statements and even greater financing stress, corporations with high financial constraints have strong incentives to manage earnings. The existing literature investigates the existence of earnings management through methods of event studies. We observe whether corporations with financial constraints appear earnings management strategies and estimate various earnings management patterns caused by different kinds of financial constraints. We find that corporations with financial constraints eliminate the negative effects of information asymmetry by ways of earnings management. Corporations with financial constraints and low growth rate have significant loss avoidance behavior; corporations with both financial constraints and high growth rate have income smoothing effects. We infer that the potential goals are to lower the cost of capital and to communicate information. We also conclude that small-size companies present aggressive earnings strategies and are not affected by different growth opportunities. Managers manipulate accruals to achieve earnings benchmark, bonus plan, or conceal investment inefficiency.