代理問題、資訊揭露和資本投資現金流量敏感性

Abstract

本研究旨在分析公司代理問題、資訊揭露和資本投資現金流量敏感性三者的關係。本研究證實公司代理問題會明顯提高資本投資現金流量敏感性的程度，且核心代理問題對資本投資現金流量敏感性的影響更甚於傳統代理問題。此外，本研究亦發現，公司代理問題使資本投資對現金流量敏感性提高的現象，可透過提高公司的資訊揭露水準來降低。總而言之，本文的最大貢獻是發現核心代理問題是公司資本投資現金流量敏感性的重要決定因素之一。

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationships among corporate agency problem, information disclosure and investment-cash flow sensitivity. Our findings suggest that agency problems increase the degree of investment-cash flow sensitivity, and core agency problems have a greater impact than traditional agency problems. In addition, this paper also finds that companies with greater transparency will decrease the degree of investment cash flow sensitivity. In sum, we find that the core agency problems are the key determinant of the investment-cash flow sensitivity, which is our major contribution in the literature.