公司治理、資本支出決策與公司價值

Abstract

本研究以追蹤資料探討民國92年至96年台灣上市公司當季資本支出比率，實證結果發現台灣上市公司資本支出比率存在季節效果。再者，本研究討論不同公司治理機制對於投資決策的影響，實證結果發現未聘任獨立董事、機構法人持股比率較低的公司，會因代理問題造成經理人制訂出和投資機會相反的投資決策。此外，本研究也發現過度投資的公司會導致公司績效較差，而且未聘任獨立董事、經理人持股比率較低、機構法人持股比率較低的公司，經理人容易產生過度投資的情形。最後，本研究發現董事長兼任總經理、聘任獨立董事、家族企業、董事會規模越大、董事持股比率、機構法人持股比率越多的公司，這些公司會因為監督機制較為完備或代理問題較低，故制訂出的資本支出計畫能創造出更多公司價值。

This study used panel data from 2003 to 2007 to investigate the quarterly capital expenditure ratios of the listed companies in Taiwan. The empirical results proved that seasonal effects did exist in the capital expenditure ratios of the listed companies in Taiwan. This study also discussed the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on investment strategies. The empirical results showed that the companies with either no independent board directors or relatively low institutional investor shareholdings could experience agency problems, leading to managers proposing opposite investment strategies to investment opportunities. This study also discovered that excessive investment leads to inferior firm performance, and insufficient investment leads to superior firm performance. The companies with no independent board directors, relatively low manager shareholdings, and relatively low institutional investor shareholdings could result in excessive investment. This study further discovered that the companies possessing the characteristics of a chairman of the board as the general manager, independent board directors, family business, larger board, high director shareholdings and high institutional investor shareholdings can propose superior capital expenditure strategies to create more corporate value due to relatively comprehensive supervisory mechanisms and fewer agency problems.