經理人罰金、財務報表可靠性與法律機制

Abstract

美國Sarbanes-Oxley法案為防制財務報表被誤述，規範經理人誤述財務報表的刑事與賠償責任。若公司重編財務報表，則公司經理人（執行長與財務長）應歸還自公司已獲得之紅利、或以誘因或權益為基礎的酬勞、及出售股票的利得。本研究從公司治理與社會福利觀點分析經理人罰金之效果。首先本研究運用賽局理論分析並比較經理人罰金歸屬制度對公司治理之影響，發現經理人罰金歸屬會計師的效果較歸屬公司佳。其次本研究比較經理人罰金歸屬制度對社會福利產生之影響，發現經理人罰金之規範無法提高社會福利。最後本研究考量公司治理與社會福利之目標，對Sarbanes-Oxley法案經理人罰金之規範提出兩個修正建議。本研究主要的貢獻有二：先找出公司治理效果之衡量指標，並比較其差異，再以社會福利評價法律機制之優劣，此思考架構可以作為我國未來制定會計與審計準則之參考；另外，我國未來若要引進Sarbanes-Oxley法案，可考慮加入本研究提出之建議。

The ”Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002” has imposed crime responsibility and liability rule on managers to prevent fraudulent financial reports. If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement, the managers (the chief executive officer and chief financial officer) of the issuer shall reimburse the issuer for any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation received by that person from the issuer and any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer. We analyze the effectiveness of manager forfeiture from both corporate governance and social welfare perspectives. First of all, by using the game theoretical analysis to compare the effectiveness of corporate governance in manager-forfeit-allocate systems, we show that it will be better if the manager forfeiture is given to the CPAs. Next, comparing the social welfare in different manager-forfeit-sharing systems, we find that the regulation of manager forfeiture will not increase social welfare. Finally, this research proposes two manager-forfeit-allocation systems by considering the objectives of corporate governance and social welfare. There are two major contributions in this paper. First, the model of finding corporate governance indicators, comparing effectiveness, and evaluating the system from the social welfare perspective that we used in this paper may be a suitable framework for setting accounting and auditing standards in the future. Besides, when considering adapting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2000 to our needs, Taiwan government may consider incorporating the proposal made in this paper.