多角化與董事會獨立性對公司價值之影響－國際金融機構之驗證

Abstract

本文以國際金融機構為研究樣本來探討多角化、董(監)事與各委員會獨立性對金融機構價值之影響。在衡量多角化效果方面，本文採用Laeven and Levine(2007)的方法來衡量多角化所造成的影響，並以美式一元制、德式雙元制和日本並列制三種內部治理制度分別進行探討。而本文之研究結果顯示，多角化折價的現象並非直接來自於多角化本身，而是在金融機構董事會與各委員會獨立性低的條件下進行多角化才會產生明顯的多角化折價現象，同時本文也發現獨立性高的金融機構能透過提高內部監督功能來降低代理成本，進而減緩多角化對公司帶來的負面影響。

This paper study the effects of diversification and board independence on firm value by using the data of international financial institutions. we employs the activity-adjusted q and excess value method from Laeven and Levine(2007) to measure the effects of diversification on value of financial institutions and discusses three different types of corporate governance systems, single board system, tow-tier board system and corporate auditor system. The empirical results show that the diversification discount effect does not come directly from diversification itself. It is conditional on the lack of independence of governance system. The results also show that an independent financial institution could reduce its agency cost by enforcing the internal mechanisms of corporate governance rigorously. Furthermore, it could lessen the downside effect of diversification as well.