公司治理與特殊性資產 對傳承決策的影響

Abstract

Bennedsen, Fan, Jian and Yeh (2015)提出創辦人於創立公司時賦予公司難以估計與移轉的特殊性資產，故創辦人傾向選擇家族成員擔任接任者，以求保留特殊性資產帶給公司的價值。此研究亦指出傳承事件會造成公司價值之減損。 根據Bennedsen et al.(2015)，本研究納入影響家族傳承新變數：(1)特殊性資產，包含政治關係、銀行關係、員工關係 (2)公司治理指標 (3)控制股東家族特性(配偶數、子女個數、第一個小孩性別)。同時考量對公司最具影響力的控制股東家族，以及公司治理品質，對傳承決策的影響。 相較Bennedsen et al.(2015)研究1987年至2005年台灣家族傳承比例高達74%，本研究發現1997年至2012年台灣家族傳承比例下降至53%。實證結果證明特殊資產(政治關係、銀行關係)較高者的確會傾向家族傳承。然而，隨著台灣公司治理法規日趨完善，本研究發現公司治理品質較好的企業會降低家族傳承機率。Bennedsen et al.(2015)與本研究皆證實家族傳承的確會降低公司價值，然而，從本研究新納入的公司治理指標可發現，當一家企業選擇家族傳承其公司治理程度較好者，有助於提升公司價值。此外，本研究討論控制股東家族特性發現配偶數較多者會降低家族傳承機率，然而此現象受台灣家族企業集團化影響，因此本研究另行列出配偶數極端值個別討論。

Bennedsen, Fan, Jian and Yeh (2015) proposed that when founders establish a company, they bring the company inestimable specialized assets which are hard to be transferred. Therefore, the founders tent to choose their family members to be the successor so that they can keep the specialized asset which brings great value to the company. This research also shows that succession event will reduce the firm value. According to Bennedsen et al. (2015), this research contains new variables which affect succession decision：(1) specialized assets, such as political connection, bank relation and staff relation (2) corporate governance index (3) the characters of the controlling shareholders (the number of spouse, the number of offspring, the gender of the first child). We consider both of the most powerful controlling shareholders and the quality of corporate governance to explain the succession decisions. In comparison to Bennedsen et al. (2015) research succession cases in Taiwan during 1987 to 2005, the percentage of family succession reached 74%, but the percentage has fallen to 53% in this research which discusses from 1997 to 2012. The results explains that higher specialized asset (political connection, bank relation) leads to higher possibility to family succession. However, the company regulations are more strictly enforced, this research shows that the better the corporate governance index is, the lower the family succession behavior can happen. Bennedsen et al. (2015) and this research both find out the succession behavior will reduce the firm value, but this paper find that when a family succession company have good quality corporate governance, it will reduce the decrease of firm value from succession event. Besides, it will reduce the possibility to choose family succession when the controlling shareholder has more spouse means totally opposite. This phenomenon is affected by the family firms which are conglomerates, so this research will discuss the outlier of spouse.