標題: 多角化折價現象存在嗎?─美國上市公司再驗證
Does the Diversification Discount Exist? Verification of American Listed Companies
作者: 洪憶慈
Hung, Yi-Tzu
葉銀華
Yeh, Yin-Hua
財務金融研究所
關鍵字: 多角化;多角化公司;超額價值;多角化程度;共同保險效果;公司治理;Diversification;Diversified firm;Excess value;Extent of diversification;Coinsurance effect;Corporate governance
公開日期: 2015
摘要: 關於多角化與公司價值關係之議題,許過去研究的結果並不一致,因此本研究重新驗證多角化對公司價值之影響,我們主要使用Berger and Ofek(1995)提出的超額價值(excess value)方法,衡量多角化企業相對產業中專注型公司(focused firm)之價值,結果顯示多角化折價之情形確實存在。在確立多角化有損公司價值後,則進一步探討企業改變多角化程度之原因,以及改變後對未來公司價值之影響。我們將不同的多角化狀態分類,透過情境之比較來分析,結果發現公司之獲利能力、資本支出比例等將影響多角化決策,但是公司價值之好壞並不影響企業改變其多角化程度。然而,公司在進行多角化後,其未來之公司價值將不如從前,反而是減少多角化程度將在未來替企業創造較高的價值。 整體而言,多角化公司(diversified firm)之超額價值較專注型公司減少12.2%;且增加多角化程度之企業,其未來公司價值增加(減少)的幅度將比未改變多角化程度者,少了(多了)10.3%。本篇研究之結論支持多角化折價之現象。最後我們嘗試解釋影響多角化折價的原因,其一是部分多角化公司之現金流量相關性無法實現共同保險效果,使得公司價值無法提升;再者,由於多角化公司經理人從事反併購活動的情形較活躍,他們試圖透過這些行為鞏固其職位,因此造成公司治理不佳,使其公司之價值減損。
The purpose of this paper is to extend the discussion on diversification effect in past researches. Owing to the inconsistency of results in the past, I firstly re-verify firm values of diversified firms, compared to firms that do not diversify. I concluded that there is diversification discount which causes values of diversified firms to be lower. This statement is consistent with that of Berger and Ofek(1995). Next, I examined the determinant of corporate decisions to become more (less) diversify. The outcome surprised-- previous value of firm doesn’t matter. Actually, it is the behavior of increasing the level of diversification resulting in the discount of firm value and, however, decreasing the number of diversified segments could enhance firm values. On average, the increase (decrease) in firm value of firms getting more diversified are less (more) than companies that remain their diversification status. Furthermore, confirming the existence of diversification discount, we try to explain the phenomenon. One reason is that some diversified firms are unable to present the coinsurance effect which could increase firm value. The other factor is the entrenchment of managers who attempt to entrench their positions through some anti-takeover activities giving rise to poor corporate governance. And therefore, the firm value of such firms are dragged down.
URI: http://140.113.39.130/cdrfb3/record/nctu/#GT070153923
http://hdl.handle.net/11536/127292
Appears in Collections:Thesis