Voluntary disclosure, excess executive compensation, and firm value

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日期

2015-06-01

類型

期刊名稱

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE

卷期與頁次

第 32 卷,頁 64–90

ISSN

0929-1199

語言

英文

摘要

This study refines\' and extends Anglo-American research exploring excess executive compensation and its effects on firm value using data from Taiwan, a country in which the board members and executives of a firm often have friendly relations with one another. We find that excess executive compensation is negatively related to firm value but that voluntary disclosure practices moderate this relationship. Specifically, our results indicate that excess executive compensation has a positive effect on firm value when firms disclose comprehensive information voluntarily and that this effect is more pronounced in group-affiliated firms. Moreover, firms that provide comprehensive voluntary disclosure appear to alleviate agency problems more efficiently when their controlling shareholders have higher private benefit incentives or when these firms have higher quality corporate governance. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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引用此條目

Chung, H., Judge, W. Q., & Li, Y.-H. (2015). Voluntary disclosure, excess executive compensation, and firm value. JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 32, 64–90. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.04.001

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永久網址:https://ir.lib.nycu.edu.tw/handle/11536/127964