标题: Voluntary disclosure, excess executive compensation, and firm value
作者: Chung, Huimin
Judge, William Q.
Li, Yi-Hua
资讯管理与财务金融系
注:原资管所+财金所

Department of Information Management and Finance
关键字: Disclosure;Corporate governance;Compensation;Agency conflict;Information asymmetry
公开日期: 1-六月-2015
摘要: This study refines\' and extends Anglo-American research exploring excess executive compensation and its effects on firm value using data from Taiwan, a country in which the board members and executives of a firm often have friendly relations with one another. We find that excess executive compensation is negatively related to firm value but that voluntary disclosure practices moderate this relationship. Specifically, our results indicate that excess executive compensation has a positive effect on firm value when firms disclose comprehensive information voluntarily and that this effect is more pronounced in group-affiliated firms. Moreover, firms that provide comprehensive voluntary disclosure appear to alleviate agency problems more efficiently when their controlling shareholders have higher private benefit incentives or when these firms have higher quality corporate governance. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.04.001
http://hdl.handle.net/11536/127964
ISSN: 0929-1199
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.04.001
期刊: JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE
Volume: 32
起始页: 64
结束页: 90
显示于类别:Articles