The Asymmetric distribution between Stock Bonus and Stock Dividends: Net Incentives or Entrenchments?

Abstract

員工分紅在文獻上一直被認為是台灣高科技產業競爭力之一大貢獻來源。但是，公司法規定員工分紅與股東股利一樣，都屬盈餘分配之一種，而且都可以用現金或股利之模式來作為分配。過去高科技台灣公司傾向以「股票」分配員工紅利而以「現金」分配股東股利。很多股東抱怨這種「盈餘分配方式不對稱現象」是一種侵害股東權益之現象；反之，公司管理階層認為員工是公司獲利的主要動力，「盈餘分配方式不對稱現象」是為了留住員工的必須政策。本文探討此「盈餘分配方式不對稱現象」是否反應管理階層的「員工誘因理論」還是「侵權理論」。本文發現公司的未來績效的確與公司「盈餘分配不對稱」呈正向關係。本文的結果支持「盈餘分配方式不對稱現象」產生的員工誘因效果大於對股東的侵權效果。

Employee profit sharing stock bonus has always been regarded as the main contributor to the success of the high-tech industry in Taiwan. As profit sharing bonus and shareholder dividends are determined at the same time at the shareholder meeting under the Corporation Law in Taiwan, and can be distributed in either cash or shares, many investors question the fairness to distribute profit sharing bonus (dividends) more (less) in stocks than in cash (Chung, 2004). This study examines whether the high stock/cash proportion in employee bonus, relative to the proportion in shareholder dividends (i.e., asymmetric distribution) represents management's net incentive or entrenchment effects. Consistent with net incentive theory, the result show that firm performance, as measured by Tobin's Q and ROA, can increase with the asymmetric distribution. The results infer that the incentive effect in the asymmetric distribution dominates the entrenchment effect.