Compensation, Life Cycle, and the Value Relevance of Performance Measures

Abstract

代理理論認為提供高階經理人誘因報償具有強化績效指標的作用，有利於創造公司價值，故高階經理人薪酬及公司績效指標應是投資人評估公司價值的重要資訊。基於Ittner and Larcker (2001)認為評估管理績效與公司評價的資訊不盡然相同的質疑，且在價值攸關性的系列文獻中，尚無充分的研究足以說明薪酬所扮演的角色。故本文研究目的乃強調公司價值、績效指標與高階經理人薪酬三者之間環環相扣的關係，以我國1997至2006年之資訊電子業為研究對象，驗證高階經理人薪酬對於績效指標與公司價值的關連性之影響。實證結果顯示：1.高階經理人薪酬對於財務績效指標（盈餘）和非財務績效指標（品質績效指標、顧客滿意度績效指標與創新績效指標）與公司價值之間的關連性具正向影響；2.尤其是相對於成熟期與衰退期公司，成長期公司之高階經理人薪酬對於非財務績效指標與公司價值之間關連性具有顯著正向影響。

In light of agency theory, this study examines the effect of contracting incentives on the value relevance of five performance measures, including earnings, product quality, market shares, patents and cycletime. We apply and extend the Ohlson (1995) valuation model based on a sample from periods 1997 to 2006 in the information electronic industry in Taiwan to examine the role of top manager's compensation in value-relevance research. Our findings indicate that top manager's compensation positively moderates the association between firm value and performance measures. We further find that compensation can enhance the value relevance of nonfinancial performance measures better for firms in the growth stage than firms in the mature and decline stages. This study contributes new insight going beyond the relations observed between top manager's compensation and the value relevance of nonfinancial performance measures.