The Effect of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance on Stock Investors’ Perceptions of Earning Quality

Abstract

本文從股票投資人的觀點，探討董監事暨重要職員責任保險(簡稱D&O保險)對其盈餘品質認知之影響，股票投資人對盈餘品質的認知則以盈餘反應係數衡量。本文以2008 年至2010 年為研究期間，採用內生性二元處理模型並輔以多種估計方法，分離自我選擇效果後，實證結果發現，相對於未購買D&O 保險的公司，有購買D&O 保險的公司，盈餘反應係數較低；進一步實證結果也發現，有購買D&O 保險的公司，D&O 投保金額愈大，盈餘反應係數會愈低，而且當公司超額投保的金額愈大，盈餘反應係數會進一步惡化。本文實證結果意味著股票投資人認為公司購買D&O 保險可能會造成董監事與管理階層的道德風險增加，反而不利於盈餘品質，進而降低盈餘資訊反應在股價的程度。

Using the earnings response coefficients (ERC hereafter) as a proxy for stock investors’ perceptions of earnings quality, this study examines the effect of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance hereafter) on the ERC. Using publicly-available D&O insurance data for public firms in Taiwan from 2008 to 2010, we employ an endogenous binary treatment model and other methods to control self-selection bias on the estimation of relationship between D&O insurance and ERC. The empirical results show that firms with D&O insurance have lower ERC than those without D&O insurance. In addition, we find that firms with higher D&O insurance coverage have lower ERC and firms with higher abnormal D&O insurance coverage will further deteriorate the ERC. These results imply that stock investors believing the purchase of D&O insurance may increase the risk of moral hazard from directors and officers, as it is not conducive to earnings quality, and their earnings information on responses to stock prices will thereby be reduced.