管理當局責任保險、控制股東和股權結構

Abstract

本研究在探討管理當局利益掠奪（以控制權和現金流量權來衡量）與董監責任保險約定承保程度之關聯性。實證結果發現當公司控制股東與小股東存在較大代理問題時，則較會購買董監事責任保險。此外，我們進一步發現，若控制股東面臨較大訴訟風險時，將傾向購買相對異常較高額度的董監事責任保險承保額度。本文的結果指出當公司傾向透過購買董監事責任保險，來緩和控制股東與外部股東間代理衝突所引起的訴訟風險。

This study investigates whether controlling shareholders with managerial entrenchment, as measured by greater deviation in cash flow and control rights, are associated with managerial liability coverage. Using a sample of director and officer (D&O) liability insurance data, we find that firms with more serious agency conflicts between controlling and outside shareholders are more likely to purchase D&O liability insurance. We also find that controlling shareholders who face greater litigation risk have an incentive to carry abnormally high D&O liability insurance coverage. Our results indicate that an incentive exists to acquire managerial liability coverage against litigation risks arising from incentive conflicts between controlling and outside shareholders.