績效目標偏離、董事會治理與風險承擔決策：以電子製造業之資產投資為例

Abstract

本研究結合企業行為理論與代理理論之觀點，檢驗績效偏離程度與董事會治理的交互效果對風險承擔決策及後續績效的影響。由於決策存在潛在的自我選擇偏誤，因而本研究採用Heckman二階段模型，以第一階段所建立之Probit模型，估算出 inverse Mills ratio修正樣本自我選擇偏誤，並透過樣本分割，於第二階段模型納入自我選擇修正因子，淨化風險承擔與後續績效之關係。實證時，以2002-2007年間上市資訊電子業為研究對象，取得不平衡追蹤資料計1914個觀測值建立Probit模型，據以檢驗董事會治理及過去績效的偏離狀況對資產投資決策之影響。實證結果顯示當企業獲利超越目標時，董事長兼總經理、董事會規模以及董事持股與企業新增投資呈負向影響。第二階段則將樣本依資產成長率分為風險承擔與風險迴避二群分別建立模型，在控制自我選擇修正因子後，企業投資與後續績效呈顯著的正向關係。

This study combines the perspectives of agency theory and behavioral theory, and aims to examine the impact of the interaction effect between deviating performance and board governance on risk-taking decision and sequential performance. There is a potential self-selection bias in risk-taking decision. Hence, this study controls self-selection bias via Heckman's two-stage decision model. Using the Probit model established in the first stage, this study will estimate an inverse Mills ratio to correct the self-selection bias. In the second stage, this study divides the sample into risk-taking and risk-averse companies based on asset growth rate. The self-selection correcting factor is then introduced to purify the relationship between risk-taking and sequential performance for publicly traded companies in the information-electronics industry. Empirically, using a unbalanced panel data from 2002 to 2007, 1914 observations are utilized to establish the Probit model to examine the impact of board governance and aspiration deviation of past performance on decision-making. The empirical results of the first stage find that CEO duality, board side and board ownership negatively affect the investment decision when performance is above the aspiration level. In the second stage, the empirical results indicate a positive relationship between corporate investment and sequential performance when the self-selection bias has been controlled.