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dc.contributor.authorYang, CCen_US
dc.contributor.authorWang, RCen_US
dc.contributor.authorChang, TYen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-08T15:19:30Z-
dc.date.available2014-12-08T15:19:30Z-
dc.date.issued2005-03-25en_US
dc.identifier.issn0096-3003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2004.03.017en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11536/13886-
dc.description.abstractRecently, Yang and Shieh proposed two password authentication schemes by employing smart cards. One is a timestamp-based password authentication scheme and the other is a nonce-based password authentication scheme. In 2002, Chan and Cheng pointed Out that Yang and Shieh's timestamp-based password authentication scheme was vulnerable to the forgery attack. However, in 2003, Sun and Yell pointed Out that Chan and Cheng's attack was unreasonable. At the same time, Sun and Yell pointed out that Yang and Shieh's password authentication schemes were still Vulnerable to the forgery attack. In this paper, we shall improve Yang and Shieh's schemes to resist Sun and Yell's attack. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.subjectauthenticationen_US
dc.subjectforgery attacken_US
dc.subjectpassworden_US
dc.subjectsmart carden_US
dc.titleAn improvement of the Yang-Shieh password authentication schemesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.amc.2004.03.017en_US
dc.identifier.journalAPPLIED MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTATIONen_US
dc.citation.volume162en_US
dc.citation.issue3en_US
dc.citation.spage1391en_US
dc.citation.epage1396en_US
dc.contributor.department資訊工程學系zh_TW
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Computer Scienceen_US
dc.identifier.wosnumberWOS:000226860100031-
dc.citation.woscount16-
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