思考方式與權力對決策自私程度之影響：雙認知系統決策理論的測試

Abstract

本研究的目的是探討在賽局中，使用系統一思考或系統二的思考與決策權力大、小對分配者決策自利程度的影響。74位大學生以及研究生中，一半的人先在系統一的思考方式下進行權力大小兩個賽局的決策，接著再以系統二思考方式下決策；另一半受試者則先進行系統二決策，再進行系統一的決策。系統一、二的思考方式是以有、無決策時間限制來操弄。本研究假設，以系統一的思考方式做決策，會受社會公平性認知的影響而較不自私。相反的，系統二的思考下，人會思考如何能夠不被懲罰且獲得最大利益，決策因此會偏向自私。研究發現，系統一決策較系統二決策公平的假設，只有在系統一的決策順序是在系統二思考之前時被支持，當系統一、二決策順序對調，系統一決策較不自私的現象消失，顯示人在系統二的決策具有學習效應。當人掌握絕對權力時，系統一、二下的決策自私程度相近，分配者保留給自己的金額分別為0.746及0.750。在權力較小的最後通牒賽局中，系統一決策保留給自己的錢0.504比系統二決策少（0.538），差異雖不顯著，但與預測方向相符。

The dual process theory of thinking predicted that as compared to system 2 thinking, making decision by system 1 of thinking would activate related social knowledge from ones memory. Consequently, the decision would be less selfish. Seventy-four undergraduate and graduate students participated in the study. Half of them made decisions in games first in 10-second time limit（system 1）, then without time limit（system 2）. The rest of them made decisions in the reverse order. Data showed that only when system 1 thinking was engaged before system 2 thinking, the hypothesis was supported. When system 1 decisions were made after system 2 decisions, participants were as selfish in the system 1 thinking mode as in the system 2. In dictator games in which distributor’s decision must be accepted by the recipient, the average amount of endowment distributors kept for themselves was 74.6% in system 1, and 75% in system 2. In contrast, in ultimatum games in which recipients have means to punish distributors unfairness allocation, the average amount of endowment distributors kept for themselves was less (50.4%) in system 1, then in system 2 (53.8%). Although the difference was not statistically significant, it was consistent with the prediction.