由公司治理角度探討股權結構、董事會特性對公司資訊不對稱之影響

Abstract

隨著資本市場的蓬勃發展，當中充斥的資訊也愈趨於繁瑣與專業，一連串重大弊案與金融危機，都反映出證券市場中訊息的知情者(insider)與外部投資人(outsider)間的資訊落差，這也突顯了落實公司治理的重要性。

本文從公司治理機制中的股權結構與董事會特性兩構面，去探討公司治理品質對公司資訊不對稱之影響，並以分析師預測誤差與離散性以及分析師預測意願做為衡量影響程度之依據指標。本研究之研究對象為台灣2000年至2012年一般上市櫃公司，資料來自台灣經濟新報(TEJ)資料庫，並以Panel data 的混合迴歸模型與隨機效果模型進行估計，最後以改變樣本期間與迴歸方法的方式對迴歸結果進行穩健性分析。從實證結果中可發現，股權結構中的股權集中度愈高，分析師預測誤差與離散性會愈低，並且分析師會有愈高的預測意願。而董事會特性中的獨立董事比例愈高，分析師預測誤差與離散性則會愈低。股權結構中的內部人持股率、董事會特性中的CEO雙重性與審計委員會設立與否，對分析師的預測誤差與離散以及分析師的預測意願實證迴歸結果，方向不明確(實證結果與穩健性結果不同)以及顯著性不足。從實證結果暗示著，股權集中度高低與公司獨立董事比例可用來檢視公司資訊環境品質的好壞與否。

With the vigorous development of the capital market, there is filled with information which become more cumbersome and professional. A series of major scandals and financial crisis reflect the gap between the insider and the outsider in the stock market. This highlights the importance of implementing corporate governance.

We explored the effects of the ownership structure and board’s characteristics on asymmetric information. We employed accuracy and consensus in analysts’ earnings forecasts and the extent of analyst following to proxy for the degree of asymmetric information. This study used Taiwan general listed company as subject, period from 2000 to 2012, and data downloaded from the database of Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ). To estimate and analyze the panel data, random effects model and pooled regression model had been adopted in this study. Robustness checks had been used to verify the correctness of method. According to the empirical results in this research, it shows that ownership concentration and proportion of independent director have negative effect on asymmetric information. These results suggest that higher level of ownership concentration and more outside director can mitigate asymmetric information and improve transparency between investors.