原股東之敵意併購行為對股東財富之影響 以中石化公司和力麗集團為例

Abstract

本研究選擇中石化與力麗集團發生於2012年的敵意併購案件為研究對象，透過個案研究法深入分析事件原由與流程。經過整理將事件分成三個不同階段進行討論，分別是力鵬與中石化、力麗與中石化以及股東會後。並且搭配事件研究法分析結果作為此期間雙方攻防互動對於股東財富是否有顯著影響的依據。

本研究結果發現目標公司面對敵意併購事件所採取的行動，對於股東財富並沒有顯著影響。原因可能在於本案屬於大股東所發起之敵意併購，帶有經營權爭奪性質，因此市場評價公司價值並未因此併購案變更。

而在主併公司的部分，由於必須投入額外資源去取得目標公司經營權，因此在該事件期間所採取的行動，確實會對股東財富產生相對應的影響。

本研究最後建議，當公司屬於少數股權掌握董事會經營權時，做決策時應與公司內部主要股東做適當之溝通，除了有助於良好公司治理形象之建立外，也能避免後續不必要之爭議。而法人股東應以理性溝通為首選，以避免股東財富因併購行為產生不必要的損失。

This research is focus on the hostile takeover event between Sinopec and Lealea Group happened in 2012 and use case study to analyze the origins of this event. Distinguish whole event from three different parts: Lealea and Sinopec , Lipeng and Sinopec , and after stock holder’s meeting. We use event study’s result as evidence for whether the stock holder’s wealth had changed significantly during the event period.

Our results found out that the action taken by target firm to confront hostile takeover had less effect on stock holder’s wealth. The reason of the phenomenon may due to the hostile takeover is caused by original stock holder which makes the event become a management right contest so the valuation of our target firm didn’t change.

In order to acquire the management right of target firm, acquiring firm input extra resources which lead to significant change in stock holder’s wealth during the event period.

Our findings suggest that when board of director has low stakes of their firms, appropriate communication is necessary for making decision. Not only to set up a well Corporate Governance but to avoid unexpected disputes in the future. All in all, rational communication is the best choice for institutional shareholders, and it can prevent their wealth from losing as well.