標題: 台灣上市櫃公司預期管理現象之探討
Expectation Management in Taiwan
作者: 吳昱錫
謝文良
Wu, Yu-Hsi
Hsieh, Wen-Liang
財務金融研究所
關鍵字: 財務分析師;盈餘管理;預期管理;非預期盈餘;Analysts;Earnings forecasts;Expectation Management;Earnings Surprises
公開日期: 2015
摘要: 預期管理為公司引導分析師盈餘預測之行為,譬如公司引導分析師調降預測至可達到的水平。公司在盈餘宣告日公布之真實盈餘若無法達成分析師之盈餘預測,會對股價造成影響,然而若是會計審核較嚴格的地區,管理階層無法利用盈餘管理,便有可能透過預期管理的方式來達到目標。本文便針對台灣之預期管理現象做探討,使用資料為2006年至2013年分析師報告,由45家券商分析師所發布,受評公司為419家台灣上市櫃公司,共計30976筆觀察值。本文透過個別券商和整體公司的角度,發現分析師預測從樂觀到悲觀的比例異常的高,且預測值也會隨著盈餘宣告日的接近而逐漸降低,證實台灣確實存在預期管理現象;另外,從文獻提供的迴歸模型中,發現台灣市場給予MBE(Meeting or Beating Expectation;達到分析師預期)公司較高的報酬。然而,公司若疑似透過預期管理的手段達成MBE,投資人會發現到並降低報酬。而不同類型之公司達成MBE之報酬亦不相同,如成長型公司、高比例之三大法人持股之公司在MBE時報酬會減少,而有正的淨融資活動之公司則會增加,最後,成長型公司和內部經理人欲拋售股票這兩種類型並不會特別從事預期管理來達成MBE,而其餘兩者皆有從事預期管理之現象。
Earning expectations is a behavior that management guide analysts’ earnings forecast. For example, management guides analysts to revise their forecasts downward to a beatable level. Failing to meet or beat earnings expectation formed by analysts’ earnings forecast on the Earnings announcement date may result in a bad influence to their stock price. However, management may use expectation management instead of earning management if the accounting audit is strict. We study the phenomenon of expectation management in Taiwan. The data period is from 2006 to 2013, consisting of 30976 analyst reports issued by 45 brokers, and 419 listed firms are covered. Through the angle of each broker and the whole companies, I find that there is a high percent of analyst’s forecasts from optimistic level to pessimistic level. The forecasts are getting downward gradually with the announcement date approaches. All these evidences show that expectation management does exist in Taiwan. Through the regression from the literatures, I also find that there is a reward to MBE (Meeting or Beating Expectations) firms. However, if firms’ EPS reach the analyst’ forecast by the method of earning expectations, the investors will notice and reduce the reward to the firm. Finally, I find that different conditions of firms will get different reward when they are MBE. I examine three types of firms:growth company、high transient institutional ownership and firms with corporate financing activities. I find that the growth company and the high transient institution ownership have fewer premiums, and the firms with corporate financing company have higher premiums when they are MBE. The last two types will more likely to engage in expectation management, but growth company and insider trader will not.
URI: http://etd.lib.nctu.edu.tw/cdrfb3/record/nctu/#GT070153947
http://hdl.handle.net/11536/141461
Appears in Collections:Thesis