國際投資法制下之國家主權基金－以雙邊投保協議與ICSID紛爭解決機制之適用為核心

Abstract

美國次貸風暴發生後，現代國家的新興投資工具－以中東亞洲國家為首的國家主權基金（SWF）大舉進入美國市場以間接投資方式，收購美國重要金融機構之股份，此舉引發歐美為主的地主國大為關注，擔憂國家主權基金收購背後的政治性動機。鑒於國家主權基金由國家百分百所持有，因而具有國家主權性質。其基金內部的管理人員與政府官員具有裙帶關係；投資訊息與治理架構透明度不足，令國家主權基金在國際投資法制下的定位，乃至於管制架構，皆有待討論釐清。 「國家主權基金現象」被認為是對歐美長期主導國際投資市場的反動力量，過往扮演資本輸出國的已開發國家，角色反轉成為了資本接受國，形成了一股新的「國家資本主義」。而SWF的組織型態，因應各國的政治國情而有所不同，以三種模式呈現：國家資產池型、公法人型和私法人公司型。此三種不同型態的SWF將會影響其國際投資法制下的主體定位，主權豁免的適用，乃至於ICSID底下的聲請人當事人適格。 本文首先針對管制派所持加強管制之立場，檢視美國的FINSA法制對於外資投資的審查，誠然，訂立外資審查法規與程序，屬於一國的固有權限，惟國家以嚴格的單方行為管制國際投資，容易導致國際投資社會形成貿易保護主義，增加投資成本，降低國際資本流動的效率。且一國以單方行為作為管制SWF亦非無所界限，本文提出國際OECD宣言雖不具有法律強制性，但其所規範的綱領，則得以做為內國行政規制的界限。 進一步，從國際投資實踐以觀，SWF具有長期性投資人之特性，具有守法的動機，以俾長期與地主國於貿易上相互合作。本文以雙邊投保協議(BIT)為框架，討論對於SWF之投資保護。討論SWF是否是雙邊投保協議上的投資人。有無最惠國待遇原則、國民待遇原則和公平與公正待遇條款之適用；地主國的規制行為是否會構成間接徵收。而地主國是否可援引國家重大安全例外為抗辯。藉由諸等討論，將SWF投資帶向國際投資法制。

After the result of the Mortgage Crisis, many developing countries' investment vehicles,"Sovereign Wealth Fund" (SWF), mostly from the Middle East and Asia, enter US markets through indirect investment, purchasing the stocks of long-established financial institutions. The SWF Phenomenon that the developed countries have transformed from capital-exporting countries to capital importing countries is recognized as a provocation to the European and US dominated international investment market. This newly-formed State Capitalism has led to European and U.S host state's concerns that there could be some political strategy behind SWF's acquisitions. SWFs are 100 % controlled by their state governments. Due to SWF’s sovereign nature, the close relationship with governments’ lack of transparency for investment information, unsound governance structure, SWF's legal position within international investment law and their suitable legal structure remain to be a topic of discussion.

As for the legal structure of SWF varying from state to state, they can be categorized as three types: 1) a pool of State's assets 2) an entity with pubic legal personality 3) an entity with private legal personality. The three types of SWF influences the status of SWF under international investment law, the application of state immunity, and the standing resorts to International Centre for Settlement of the Investment Disputes (ICSID).

This paper demonstrates the position of governing SWF investment, in reviewing how The Foreign Investment and National Security Act 2007 (FINSA) of US applies to foreign investment. Indeed, it is a state's inherent privilege to legislate regulation regarding foreign investment. Nvertheless, facilitating strict unilateral acts may lead to trade protectionism of international investment, increase the cost of investment, and decrease the efficiency of international capital flows. Furthermore, it is not generally acceptable to regulate SWF investment through unilateral acts. This paper proposes that even though of The OECD Declaration and Santiago Principle don't not having legal binding force, it can served as the boundaries of domestic regulations of the host state. Given SWF’s practice, SWF has been a longterm investor and willing to obey host-state’s regulation, since SWF has a strong motivation to corporate with host states commercially. This paper concludes that Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) can serve as a framework to discuss investment protection to SWF.

Considering the application of BIT to SWF Investment, following issues shall be developed: Whether SWF benefits from those investment protection clauses－ National Treatment, Most-Favored-Nation Treatment, Fair and Equitable Standard and Indirect Expropriation clauses against host state depends on the definition of " investor " and " investment "in the relative BIT . On the contrary, from the standpoint of host states, how to invoke Essential Security Exception Clause to legalize its actions. Furthermore, whether SWF may act as claimant in ICSID arbitration will be analyzed in depth in this article.