經理人過度自信與審計能力對自結盈餘資訊揭露決策的影響

Abstract

本研究主要從經理人過度自信與審計能力角度檢視自結盈餘資訊揭露決定因素，以及其對揭露偏誤的影響。本研究應用Two Part Model發現經理人過度自信或是選用具有審計能力的審計產業專家會比較願意揭露自結盈餘。另外，在揭露頻率決策上，本研究僅發現在審計能力上，公司若選用具有審計能力的審計產業專家會有比較高的揭露頻率。更進一步，本研究也檢視經理人過度自信與審計能力對自結盈餘與公告盈餘偏誤的影響，本研究發現總經理持股比率增加的過度自信會有較低的自結盈餘與公告盈餘偏誤；然而，審計任期愈長反而提高自結盈餘與公告盈餘偏誤。最後，檢視經理人與事務所之間的協議能力，本研究發現在審計任期較短的情況下，經理人協議能力會優於事務所。

In this paper, we investigate preliminary earnings information disclosure decision from perspectives of manager overconfidence and audit ability. This study adopts the Two Part Model and find that firms are willing to disclosure preliminary earnings information when manager feel overconfidence. When companies hire industry specialization auditor, companies are willing to disclosure preliminary earnings information too. In addition, firms are willing to enhance disclosure frequency when they hire industry specialization auditor. Moreover, we also investigate how preliminary earnings bias affected by manager overconfidence and audit ability. We find preliminary earnings bias decrease (increase) in manager overconfidence (auditor tenure). Finally, this study finds that overconfidence manager have superiority over accounting firms when we investigate bargaining power between manager and accounting firms.