完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位語言
dc.contributor.authorChou, Hsin-Ien_US
dc.contributor.authorHamill, Philip A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorYeh, Yin-Huaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-21T05:53:49Z-
dc.date.available2018-08-21T05:53:49Z-
dc.date.issued2018-06-01en_US
dc.identifier.issn0929-1199en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.10.012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11536/145200-
dc.description.abstractGlobally many regulators adopted a rules-based approach to independent director appointments stipulating Independence' criteria. This paper investigates whether partitioning a regulatory compliant sample of independent director appointments by prior affiliation to the board influences the relationship between ownership and control rights, and performance. We report a significant positive relationship between board independence and controlling shareholders' cash-flow rights for firms where the appointee had prior affiliation to the board, but no performance improvement. Firms where the regulatory compliant independent directors had no prior-affiliation to the board experienced significant improvement in firms' next period Return -on-Assets. Appointing affiliated directors is indicative diminished board quality, which is consistent with the empirical evidence that controlling shareholders determine board quality to accommodate tunneling to extract the private benefits of control to compensate for significant additional costs associated with concentrated ownership (Yeh and Woidtke, 2005; Luo et al., 2012; Liu et at, 2015). The positive association between performance and unaffiliated independent directors suggests a desire to introduce expertise to receive benefits via improved firm performance which is consistent with the literature, mostly from studies of emerging markets, reporting a causal link from independent directors to firm performance (Choi et al., 2007; Dahya et at 2008; Liu et al., 2015). (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.subjectTaiwanen_US
dc.subjectCorporate governanceen_US
dc.subjectIndependent directorsen_US
dc.subjectIncentive alignmenten_US
dc.subjectEntrenchmenten_US
dc.subjectPerformanceen_US
dc.titleAre all regulatory compliant independent director appointments the same? An analysis of Taiwanese board appointmentsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.10.012en_US
dc.identifier.journalJOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCEen_US
dc.citation.volume50en_US
dc.citation.spage371en_US
dc.citation.epage387en_US
dc.contributor.department資訊管理與財務金融系 註:原資管所+財金所zh_TW
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Information Management and Financeen_US
dc.identifier.wosnumberWOS:000436917500017en_US
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