The venture capital entry model on game options with jump-diffusion process

檔案

日期

2011-11-01

類型

期刊名稱

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION ECONOMICS

卷期與頁次

第 134 卷第 1 期,頁 87–94

ISSN

0925-5273

語言

英文

摘要

This paper aims to apply game options to construct the optimal decision-making and management tool for venture capital (VC) firms. This model emphasizes the inferences with game options on the market structures formed by different competition and investment strategies of the two VC firms to reflect the investment returns. These market structures are classified into an entry-deterred game (specific monopoly), a leader's dominated strategies (duopoly), and simultaneous investment. It is considered how to select investment timing to avoid any potential competitive threats in order to provide the optimal expected threshold values for the investment decisions of VC firms. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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引用此條目

Ko, C.-C., Lin, T. T., & Yang, C. (2011). The venture capital entry model on game options with jump-diffusion process. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION ECONOMICS, 134(1), 87–94. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2011.02.016

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永久網址:https://ir.lib.nycu.edu.tw/handle/11536/14712