高階經營團隊的私有資訊分享功能對其當期薪酬與前期績效關聯性影響

Abstract

本研究將高階經營團隊（top management team, TMT）的私有資訊分享功能定義為：「因為TMT參與公司經營事務，有機會獲取經理人努力的私有資訊，再藉由高階經理人身份兼任董事或是列席董事會而將其擁有的私有資訊在董事會中分享，進而讓董事會做出更正確的決策」。本研究探討TMT是否發揮私有資訊分享功能，而影響董事會在TMT當期薪酬決策中對其前期績效的考量。實證結果發現TMT的當期薪資及紅利都和其前期績效表現呈現正相關。此項實證結果支持TMT可能透過兼任董事抑或是列席董事會而有機會在董事會上分享其私有資訊，有助於董事會利用較佳的前期績效來推測TMT較佳的能力或努力，進而決定TMT當期薪酬合約，並因此提高其本期保留薪資或紅利誘因。除此之外，本研究亦發現TMT當期薪資及紅利與前期績效表現之正向關聯性，會因董事會之董事由TMT成員兼任比重提高而提升，但卻會因為TMT之總經理兼任董事長而降低，進一步支持董事會在TMT當期薪酬決策中考量其前期績效時，會受到TMT私有資訊分享功能的影響。

This study defines top management team's (TMT) private information sharing function as the TMT's influence on board decisions when TMT share private information obtained from business operations through board meetings. The paper investigates whether TMT's private information sharing affects the relation between TMT's past performance and the board's design of TMT's current performance contract. The empirical results show that TMT's salary and bonus are both positively correlated with past performance. The evidence is consistent with the notion that TMT's private information sharing allows the board observe TMT's capability and efforts from TMT's past performance when the board designs TMT's current reservation wages and incentives. We further find that the relation between TMT's compensation and past performance increases with the percentage of TMT also serving as directors while decreases with CEO duality, supporting the contribution of TMT's private information sharing to the linkage between TMT's past performance and current compensation contracts.