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dc.contributor.authorJuang, Wei-Torngen_US
dc.contributor.authorSun, Guang-Zhenen_US
dc.contributor.authorYuan, Kuo-Chihen_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-10-05T01:59:42Z-
dc.date.available2020-10-05T01:59:42Z-
dc.date.issued2020-06-01en_US
dc.identifier.issn0020-7276en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00705-0en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11536/154832-
dc.description.abstractWe develop a model of two parallel contests, asymmetric in quantity of homogeneous prizes open to contest, with a finite number of homogeneous risk-neutral bidders. Whether the bidder upon entry into a particular contest is aware of the realized number of competing contestants in the contest is irrelevant to the expected effort at equilibrium. At equilibrium the expected effort per capita in the larger contest (the contest with more prizes) is greater than that in the smaller one. The larger contest nonetheless does not attract enough contestants to achieve optimum in rent extraction from the bidders.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.subjectParallel contestsen_US
dc.subjectRent extractionen_US
dc.subjectParticipation effecten_US
dc.subjectEffort effecten_US
dc.titleA model of parallel contestsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00182-019-00705-0en_US
dc.identifier.journalINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORYen_US
dc.citation.volume49en_US
dc.citation.issue2en_US
dc.citation.spage651en_US
dc.citation.epage672en_US
dc.contributor.department經營管理研究所zh_TW
dc.contributor.departmentInstitute of Business and Managementen_US
dc.identifier.wosnumberWOS:000545778900012en_US
dc.citation.woscount0en_US
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