Opportunistic strategy under cooperation: Subtle, deceitful practices in Taiwan’s agri-food supply chain

Abstract

交易成本理論（TCE）學者將機會主義視為交易成本的主要來源並阻礙合作；然而，於農業與食品產業，即使契約合作中夥伴保持機會主義做法，其仍舊為業內普遍的做法。因此，基於契約農業，本研究將機會主義行為區隔為微妙與欺騙性的做法，闡明不同機會主義做法可如何降低合作的交易成本。本研究基於台灣有機農產品供應鏈中的 113 筆契約農業交易，並採用Heckman 模型解決樣本選擇偏差問題。實證結果發現，在合作交易下，決策者之機會主義行為，受到其對合作夥伴機會主義感知的影響。決策者對合作夥伴欺騙行為的感知，將增強其微妙和欺騙行為。本研究採用認知失調觀點提出下面三項貢獻，以擴展交易和關係合作的理解：首先，機會主義行為可視為對合作夥伴機會主義感知的戰略反應，而不是對行為的假設。此外，這項研究將微妙和欺騙性的做法與機會主義行為區分開來。最後，利用認知失調的觀點，本研究認為能夠減少認知失調之機會主義策略，可能是一種可減緩交易成本之治理模式。

Transaction cost theory (TCE) scholars regard opportunism as a source of transaction cost that hinders cooperation; however, collaboration, such as contract farming, is widespread in the food and agribusiness industry, even if most partnerships maintain opportunistic practices. Therefore, based on contract farming, this study elucidates how opportunistic practices diminish the transaction cost of cooperation by distinguishing subtle and deceitful practices from opportunistic behavior. This study employs the Heckman model to resolve the sample selection bias problem based on 113 contract farming transactions in Taiwan’s organic agri-food supply chain. Under cooperative transactions, opportunistic behavior is affected by the decision-maker's perception of their partners’ opportunism. The perception of partners’ deceitful and unethical behaviors enhances the decision-maker’s subtle and deceitful behavior. This study adopts the cognitive dissonance perspective to extend the transactional and relational views of cooperation using three approaches. First, this study views opportunistic behavior as a strategic response to the perception of partners’ opportunism rather than an assumption of behavior. In addition, this study distinguishes subtle and deceitful practices from opportunistic behaviors. Finally, using the cognitive dissonance view, this study argues that opportunistic strategy, which reduces cognitive dissonance and is a type of governance mode, diminishes transaction cost.