重审台湾宪法法院的政治角色─以大法官释字第 261号为例

Abstract

本文透过分析大法官释字第 261 号出现的政治背景，重新检视台湾宪法法院在民主化过程中扮演的角色。释字第 261 号长期以来被许多法律学者视为是推动台湾民主化最重要的释宪案。在这个释宪案中，大法官为第一届多年未被改选的中央民代设下了确切的退职期限，促成了国会全面改选。法律学者大多对此释宪案有很高的评价，认为大法官展现了民主化的机能。本文挑战这样的观点。我们透过分析宪法法院作成释字第 261 号时的政治脉络，论证大法官在民主化过程并非扮演民主倡议者的角色，反之，他们的角色较接近于政治潮流的旁观者。即使没有 261 号解释文，台湾的民主化进程并没有太大的影响。我们同时论证 261 号解释文有下列三个政治功能：第一、为当时的执政者解决一个政治上的烫手山芋；第二、解决台湾政治上的异常质；第三、合法化政治上的大趋势。

Most Taiwan law scholars claimed that the Constitutional Court paved the way for Taiwan’s democratization and constitutional reforms. These legal studies consider the J.Y. Interpretation No. 261 as the most critical decision in Taiwan’s democratic transition as this decision provided the constitutional foundations for the retirement of the first-term national representatives and led to subsequent constitutional reforms. In this paper, we challenge this dominant view. We reexamine the political role of the Constitutional Court during the processes of Taiwanese democratization by citing J.Y. Interpretation No. 261 as a hard case. We argue that the Constitutional Court made little contribution to Taiwan’s democratization. This paper shows that the role of Taiwan’s Constitutional Court in the process of democratization has been far more complicated and far less promising than is commonly thought. We also argue that J.Y. Interpretation No. 261 provides at least three political functions for the dominant party: first, it solved a political dilemma for the political elites; second, it helped the political elites to remove the political outliners. Third, it legitimated the ruling party’s political agenda.